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I. INTRODUCTION
In all real estate development projects, an inherent conflict exists
between the private land developer's need for certainty and predictability
in the governmental approval process during development and the con-
cern of local government agencies with issues of public health, safety and
welfare. The general public, represented by local government agencies,
retains ultimate control over the development of private property to pro-
tect public health, safety and welfare. However, without governmental
assurances that a project can be completed as planned, a developer is
forced to limit expenditures incurred prior to governmental approval to
minimize losses in the event the project is not approved as planned, or if
the conditions of approval are so onerous that the project becomes eco-
nomically unfeasible to complete.
It has long been accepted by the courts that at some point in the
development process the expenditures and dedications made by a devel-
oper in good faith reliance on initial governmental approvals should es-
top the government from applying regulatory changes that will prevent
completion of a contemplated project or that will substantially impair the
developer's investment.' Determining the particular point when a devel-
oper is entitled to protection is difficult. Faced with this uncertainty, it is
essential that a developer in California have a working knowledge of the
common-law2 and statutory3 bases under which a vested right to com-
plete a project may arise. In addition, the developer should understand
the constitutional principles of, and potential claims that can arise under,
the theory of inverse condemnation.'
The common-law vested rights rule provides that a property owner
does not acquire a vested right to construct improvements under a spe-
cific land use classification until the developer has (1) obtained a valid
1. See, eg., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987); Monterey Sand
Co. v. California Coastal Comm'n, 191 Cal. App. 3d 169, 236 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1987); Anderson
v. City Council, 229 Cal. App. 2d 79, 40 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1964).
2. See infra notes 26-199 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 200-83 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 284-438 and accompanying text.
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building permit; and (2) performed substantial work and incurred sub-
stantial liabilities in good faith reliance on the permit.' Until a property
owner or developer acquires a vested right to complete a project, local
governmental agencies retain complete authority to modify, control, con-
dition or disapprove a proposed development, even after work has com-
menced, subject only to the limitation that the government action cannot
be arbitrary or discriminatory.6 The vested rights rule only provides de-
velopers with modest assurances that a project undertaken in reliance on
governmental approvals can be completed as designed.7 Due to the Cali-
fornia courts' reluctance to expand the limited protections of the vested
rights rule, the development community sought legislative relief to re-
duce the developer's risk of financial and professional loss due to unex-
pected changes in land use regulation or changes in the composition of a
community's elected governing body.'
The California legislature enacted the Development Agreement leg-
islation9 in 1979 and the Vesting Tentative Map legislation in 19840 to
expand the protection for developers. Under the Development Agree-
ment statutes, a local government agency may, but is not required to,
enter into a "Development Agreement" with a property owner as a
means to guide the development of the property. 1 By utilizing a Devel-
opment Agreement, a developer assures itself of the right to construct
specific improvements.
A Development Agreement may afford a developer the greatest de-
gree of certainty available in today's development process; however, local
agencies are not required to make this option available. 2 In addition,
implementing a Development Agreement often involves protracted and
complex negotiations. The major shortcoming of the Development
5. See sources cited infra note 26.
6. See, eg., Selby Realty Co. v. City of San Buenaventura, 10 Cal. 3d 110, 125-26, 514
P.2d 111, 120-21, 109 Cal. Rptr. 799, 808-09 (1973); Raley v. California Tahoe Regional Plan-
ning Agency, 68 Cal. App. 3d 965, 978-82, 137 Cal. Rptr. 699, 707-10 (1977); Morgan v.
County of San Diego, 19 Cal. App. 3d 636, 641, 97 Cal. Rptr. 180, 182-83 (1971); Kissinger v.
City of Los Angeles, 161 Cal. App. 2d 454, 460, 462, 327 P.2d 10, 15, 16 (1958); Munns v.
Stenman, 152 Cal. App. 2d 543, 551-52, 314 P.2d 67, 73-74 (1957).
7. See, eg., Patterson v. Central Coast Regional Coastal Zone Conservation Comm'n, 58
Cal. App. 3d 833, 130 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1976); Avco Community Developer's, Inc. v. South
Coast Regional Comm'n, 17 Cal. App. 3d 785, 553 P.2d 546, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1083 (1977); Oceanic Cal., Inc. v. North Cent. Coast Regional Comm'n, 63
Cal. App. 3d 57, 133 Cal. Rptr. 664 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 951 (1977).
8. See infra notes 200-83 and accompanying text.
9. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65864-65869.5 (West 1983 & Supp. 1988).
10. Id. §§ 66498.1-66498.9 (West Supp. 1988).
11. Id. §§ 65864-65869.5.
12. Id. § 65865.
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Agreement is that it does not protect a developer from the effects of fed-
eral and state laws and regulations that are enacted after the agreement is
entered into.
13
Alternatively, the Vesting Tentative Map statutes14 permit the filing
of a Vesting Tentative Map (VTM) which, if approved, gives the devel-
oper a vested right to proceed with its development in accordance with
the local ordinances, policies and standards that are in effect at the time
the VTM is approved.15 By simply stamping on the face of a standard
tentative map the words "Vesting Tentative Map," a developer gains the
right to proceed with the development for a specified period of time.
16
The developer can obtain building permits and proceed with the develop-
ment as long as the development substantially complies with the ordi-
nances, policies and standards that are applicable when the local agency
approves the developer's completed application for a tentative subdivi-
sion map. 7 Although originally applicable only to residential subdivi-
sions, the VTM legislation became applicable to commercial and
industrial projects on January 1, 1988.18 As with the Development
Agreement legislation, the VTM legislation does not protect the devel-
oper from subsequent enactments by federal or state entities. 19
The Development Agreement and VTM each represent a legislative
expansion of the judicially-developed vested rights rule.20 Both sets of
laws, although seemingly intertwined, can be helpful to developers in dif-
ferent situations and do not necessarily overlap.2 In some situations, a
developer is well advised to use not only a VTM, but to also attempt to
negotiate and finalize a Development Agreement.22
A developer can also challenge the effects of a subsequently-enacted
land use regulation as a "taking" under the California and United States
constitutions. The United States Supreme Court recently considered the
constitutionality of land use regulations.23 In Nollan v. California
13. Id. § 65869.5.
14. Id. §§ 66498.1-66498.9.
15. Id. § 66498.1(b).
16. Id
17. Id.
18. Id. § 66498.7(b).
19. Id. § 66498.6(b).
20. See infra note 26 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 267-83 and accompanying text.
22. For example, a developer may be well advised to use both a VTM and a Development
Agreement when the developer seeks a forward commitment from a local agency as to certain
development approvals.
23. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987); First English Evangeli-
cal Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987); Agins v.
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Coastal Commission24 and First Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glen-
dale v. County of Los Angeles2" the Court refined the determination of
whether the imposition of land use regulation constitutes a taking and, if
so, whether just compensation must be paid to the property owner.
This Article reviews: (1) the development and current status of the
concept of vested rights in California; (2) the Development Agreement
and the VTM as instruments to satisfy the divergent interests of the de-
veloper and the general public; and (3) the current status and application
of the law of inverse condemnation.
II. THE CONCEPT OF VESTED RIGHTS
A. The Vested Rights Rule
In California, the judicially developed doctrine of vested rights pro-
vides that a property owner does not acquire a vested right to construct
improvements under a specific land use classification until the developer
has (1) obtained a valid building permit; and (2) performed substantial
work and incurred substantial liabilities in good faith reliance on the per-
mit.26 It is important to note that neither the existence of particular zon-
ing in itself, nor work undertaken pursuant to governmental approvals
issued prior to the construction of improvements, can legally form the
basis of a vested right to build a structure that does not comply with the
laws in effect when a building permit is issued.27 Prior to establishing a
vested right to complete a project, local agencies retain complete author-
City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); Penn Centr. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S.
104 (1978). See generally CALIFORNIA CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, COPING WITH
THE REAL PROPERTY DEVELOPMENT PROCESS (1988). See also Avco Community Develop-
ers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Comm'n, 17 Cal. 3d 785, 553 P.2d 546, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386
(1976); HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1975),
cert. denied, 452 U.S. 904 (1976); Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto, 57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 129 Cal.
Rptr. 575 (1976); Candlestick Properties, Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation and Dev.
Comm'n, 11 Cal. App. 3d 557, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1970); City of Long Beach v. Aistrup, 164
Cal. App. 41, 330 P.2d 282 (1958).
24. 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
25. 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987).
26. Anderson v. City Council, 229 Cal. App. 2d 79, 40 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1964). See, e.g.,
Halaco Eng'g v. South Cent. Coast Regional Comm'n, 42 Cal. 3d 52, 720 P.2d 15, 227 Cal.
Rptr. 667 (1986); Santa Monica Pines, Ltd. v. Rent Control Bd., 35 Cal. 3d 858, 679 P.2d 27,
201 Cal. Rptr. 593 (1984); Urban Renewal Agency v. California Coastal Zone Conservation
Comm'n, 15 Cal. 3d 577, 542 P.2d 645, 125 Cal. Rptr. 485 (1979); People v. H&H Properties,
154 Cal. App 3d 894, 201 Cal. Rptr. 687 (1984); Tosh v. California Coastal Comm'n, 99 Cal.
App. 3d 388, 160 Cal. Rptr. 170 (1979); Aries Dev. Co. v. California Coastal Zone Conserva-
tion Comm'n, 48 Cal. App. 3d 534, 122 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1975).
27. Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Comm'n, 17 Cal. 3d 785,
793, 553 P.2d 546, 551, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386, 391 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1083 (1977).
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ity to modify, control, condition or disapprove a proposed development,
subject only to the specific limitation that their actions cannot be arbi-
trary or discriminatory. 28 Once a vested right arises, however, the devel-
oper has a property right which cannot be taken without due process of
law and the payment of adequate compensation.29
By the late 1970s, it became clear to both developers and jurists that
the vested rights theory had little predictive value to assure developers
that projects undertaken in reliance on governmental approvals could be
completed as planned.30 In Raley v. California Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency,31 the California Court of Appeal observed that:
The mechanisms at work here combined to "protect" the
environment by protracted and undependable administrative
procedures followed by years of litigation. Only the most
hardy and well-heeled can run so harsh a gauntlet. Burdened
by land costs, loan interest, architectural, engineering and at-
torney fees, many entrepreneurs run out of money or heart or
both long before the finish line.
[The] [h]andmaiden of prevailing administrative anarchy
is the vested rights rule... [which] gives a green light to ad-
ministrative vascillation virtually up to the moment the builder
starts pouring concrete.32
In the past, California courts have not been receptive to the pleas of
developers who have sought to expand the modest protections afforded
by the vested rights rule.33
B. The Building Permit
California courts have held consistently that absent a building per-
mit, the government cannot be estopped from taking actions to defeat the
contemplated construction of a particular improvement, notwithstanding
28. See sources cited supra note 6.
29. U.S. CoNsT. amends. V & XIV; CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 19. See, eg., Pardee Constr. Co.
v. California Coastal Comm'n, 95 Cal. App. 3d 471, 479, 157 Cal. Rptr. 184, 188-89 (1979);
Call v. Feher, 93 Cal. App. 3d 434, 441, 155 Cal. Rptr. 387, 390 (1979); Trans-Oceanic Oil
Corp. v. City of Santa Barbara, 85 Cal. App. 2d 776, 787-89, 796-98, 194 P.2d 148, 154-55,
159-61 (1948). See infra notes 97-189 and accompanying text.
30. See sources cited supra note 7.
31. 68 Cal. App. 3d 985, 137 Cal. Rptr. 699 (1977).
32. Id. at 984-85, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 711-12.
33. See, eg.,-Penn-Co. v. Board of Supervisors, 158 Cal. App. 3d 1072, 205 Cal. Rptr. 298
(1984); Davis v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Comm'n, 57 Cal. App. 3d 700, 129 Cal.
Rptr. 417 (1976); HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal. Rptr.
365 (1975), cert denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976).
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the existence of an approved final subdivision map. 4 This is true regard-
less of how precise and limited the conditional use permit, zoning and
other preliminary approvals may be, or how substantial and detrimental
the reasonable reliance by the developer is on these approvals.
The issuance of a building permit underlies the ultimate determina-
tion as to whether a vested right has been obtained under California
law.35 The issuance of a building permit is a bright line, threshold event.
If a permit has not been issued, the unique attributes of a particular de-
velopment project will not be examined. A review of several California
cases is necessary to completely understand this aspect of the rule.
1. Avco: the need for final approval
The leading vested rights case in California is Avco Community De-
velopers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Commission,36 wherein the Califor-
nia Supreme Court had to determine "the point in the development
process at which a landowner can be said to have acquired a vested right
to construct buildings on his land."37
Prior to enactment of the Coastal Zone Conservation Act of 1972
(Conservation Act),3 Orange County, California had zoned the 74-acre
tract at issue in Avco for "Planned Community Development" and had
enacted certain "Planned District Regulations" to govern its develop-
ment.39 Avco Community Developers, Inc. (Avco) had obtained a final
subdivision map for the tract, obtained a rough grading permit, and had
installed storm drains, street improvements, culverts and utilities. 4
Avco had expended in excess of $2,000,000 in the process.41 As a condi-
tion to and in reliance upon the present planned commmunity zoning
and the issuance of the grading permit, Avco had sold Orange County
eleven acres of beach property at a price substantially below its actual
34. See, eg., HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal. Rptr.
365 (1975), cert denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976); Miller v. Board of Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 477,234
P. 381 (1925); Penn-Co. v. Board of Supervisors, 158 Cal. App. 3d 1072, 205 Cal. Rptr. 298
(1984); Court House Plaza Co. v. City of Palo Alto, 117 Cal. App. 3d 871, 173 Cal. Rptr. 161,
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1074 (1981); Davis v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Comm'n, 57
Cal. App. 3d 700, 129 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1976); Morse v. County of San Luis Obispo, 247 Cal.
App. 2d 600, 55 Cal. Rptr. 710 (1967).
35. See sources cited supra note 34.
36. 17 Cal. 3d 785, 553 P.2d 546, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1083
(1977).
37. Id. at 791, 553 P.2d 550, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
38. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §§ 27000-27650 (West 1986) (repealed 1977).
39. Avco, 17 Cal. 3d at 789, 553 P.2d at 549, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 389.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 790, 553 P.2d at 549, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 389.
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fair market value, and had dedicated additional land to provide access to
the eleven acres.42
After these expenditures and actions, but before Avco obtained
building permits, the Conservation Act went into effect. Avco was re-
quired to obtain a permit from the California Coastal Commission unless
it could be demonstrated that Avco had acquired a vested right.43 Avco
applied to the California Coastal Commission for an exemption from the
Conservation Act permit requirements, claiming that it had already ac-
quired a vested right to complete its intended project.' The Commission
denied the exemption, and its decision was upheld by the trial court.45
On appeal, the California Supreme Court unanimously affirmed. 46
The court concluded that no vested right existed under common-law
principles because building permits had not been obtained and the size,
type of building, and other specific details of the project had never been
approved.47 Avco unsuccessfully argued that the current California rule
was inapplicable for planned developments because the rule was rooted
in the context of single lot projects subject to traditional zoning.48 Avco
contended that in a situation involving a subdivision, a developer ac-
quires a vested right to construct buildings at the time it subdivides the
real property and installs improvements in reliance on governmental ap-
provals issued in contemplation of the entire development.49 The
Supreme Court disagreed:
[N]either the existence of a particular zoning nor work under-
taken pursuant to governmental approvals preparatory to con-
struction of buildings can form the basis for a vested right to
build a structure which does not comply with the laws applica-
ble at the time a building permit is issued. By zoning the prop-
erty or issuing approvals for work preliminary to construction
the government makes no representation to a landowner that
he Will be exempt from the zoning laws in effect at the subse-
quent time he applies for a building permit or that he may con-
struct particular structures on the property, and thus the
government cannot be estopped to enforce the laws in effect
42. Id. at 799, 553 P.2d at 555, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 395.
43. Id. at 788-89, 553 P.2d at 548, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
44. Id. at 790, 553 P.2d at 549, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 389.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 802, 553 P.2d at 557, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 397.
47. Id. at 789-91, 553 P.2d at 548-49, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 388-89.
48. Id. at 796, 553 P.2d at 553, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 393.
49. Id. at 791, 553 P.2d at 550, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
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when the permit is issued."
The court restated its position that by incurring substantial up-front ex-
penditures based on existing zoning and preliminary approvals, a devel-
oper takes a "calculated risk" that the rules of the game may change
before the developer obtains final building permits to complete structures
that will enable the developer to recoup its investment.51
Finally, the court rejected Avco's claim that the sale to Orange
County of certain beach property at below fair market value estopped the
state from enforcing the provisions of the Conservation Act. 2 Justice
Mosk, writing for the court, indicated that a specific approval, short of a
building permit, might give rise to a vested right if the approval at issue
provides the same degree of specificity and definition to a project that a
building permit would.53 Obviously, the determination of whether such
an approval meets this standard is a subjective one. As a result, a devel-
oper cannot be certain it has received all discretionary approvals neces-
sary to create a vested right until it receives some kind of final
determination through the courts or otherwise. Other California cases
have recognized this problem and have relied directly on the terms of
permits that demonstrate that all final discretionary approvals have been
obtained.
54
Avco involved the application of state legislation to a real estate de-
velopment under construction. 5 Several other courts have reached simi-
lar results in cases involving intervening local legislation.56 In
Youngblood v. Board of Supervisors,57 the California Supreme Court held
that developers are entitled to receive final subdivision map approval at
the moment they comply with the conditions attached to the tentative
tract map.5 8 The court stated that it was only fair to the public that a
governing body should be required to decide whether and on what
50. Id. at 793, 553 P.2d at 551, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 391.
51. Id. at 792, 553 P.2d at 550-51, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
52. Id. at 800, 553 P.2d at 556, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 395-96.
53. Id. at 797, 553 P.2d at 554, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 393-94.
54. See, ag., Oceanic Cal., Inc. v. North Cent. Coast Regional Comm'n, 63 Cal. App. 3d
57, 70, 133 Cal. Rptr. 664, 672 (1976), cert denied, 431 U.S. 951 (1977); Aries Dev. Co. v.
California Coastal Zone Conservation Comm'n, 48 Cal. App. 3d 534, 544, 122 Cal. Rptr. 315,
322-23 (1975); Environmental Coalition of Orange County, Inc. v. Avco Community Develop-
ers, Inc., 40 Cal. App. 3d 513, 523, 115 Cal. Rptr. 59, 64-65 (1974).
55. Avco, 17 Cal. 3d at 789-90, 553 P.2d at 549, 132 Cal. Rptr at 389.
56. See, e.g., Hazon-Iny Dev., Inc. v. City of Santa Monica, 128 Cal. App. 3d 1, 179 Cal.
Rptr. 860 (1982); Spindler Realty Corp. v. Monning, 243 Cal. App. 2d 255, 53 Cal. Rptr. 7,
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 975 (1966).
57. 22 Cal. 3d 644, 586 P.2d 556, 150 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1978).
58. Id. at 654-55, 586 P.2d at 560-61, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 247-48.
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grounds to approve the contemplated subdivision at the same time that it
acts on the tentative tract map.5 9
2. Oceanic: application of Avco
In Oceanic California, Inc. v. North Central Coast Regional Commis-
sion,' the California Supreme Court determined that the developer did
not have a vested right to complete its proposed development even
though the facts strongly indicated that the developer had received the
equivalent of final approval under the "building permit-equivalent" stan-
dard suggested in Avco. 61 Prior to the adoption of the Conservation Act
in 1972,62 the plaintiff, Oceanic California, Inc. (Oceanic), spent approxi-
mately $27,000,000 in connection with a large residential and commer-
cial-recreational project located in Sonoma County, California.63 From
1964 through 1972, Sonoma County had issued various approvals relat-
ing to the project, including planned community zoning, conditional use
permits for condominiums, necessary grading permits and building per-
mits for certain structures."4 As a condition of the planned community
zoning and the subdivision approvals, Oceanic agreed to impose stringent
private covenants upon the land.65 Prior to the adoption of the Conser-
vation Act, Oceanic had subdivided lots that were subsequently sold, and
had constructed single family residences and condominiums, together
with related facilities.66 Oceanic obtained a permit to appropriate certain
water located at a nearby river for use in connection with all of the units
and acquired use permits to construct three waste water treatment plants
after starting construction on two of them. Moreover, Oceanic arranged
to furnish the units with all necessary utilities at the time the units were
completed, and had previously dedicated 120 acres of ocean front prop-
erty as a park which the Board of Supervisors had agreed to accept.67
After the California Coastal Zone Conservation Act of 197268 was
adopted, Oceanic applied to the regional commission for an exemption
from the permit requirements of the Act.69 The Act provided that if a
developer had acquired a vested right based on the issuance of a valid
59. Id. at 655-56, 586 P.2d 562, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 248.
60. 63 Cal. App. 3d 57, 133 Cal. Rptr. 664 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 951 (1977).
61. Id. at 75-76, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 674-75.
62. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 27000-27650 (West 1986) (repealed 1977).
63. Oceanic, 63 Cal. App. 3d at 65, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 668.
64. Id. at 65, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 668.
65. Id. at 63, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 667.
66. Id. at 64, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 668.
67. Id. at 62-64, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 667-68.
68. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §§ 27000-27650 (West 1986) (repealed 1977).
69. Oceanic, 63 Cal. App. 3d at 61, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 666.
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buiding permit prior to the effective date of the Act, the developer was
not required to obtain an additional permit from the regional coastal
commission.70 Oceanic conceded that it had not secured a building per-
mit.71 Nonetheless, it contended that it had acquired a vested right based
on the numerous approvals and actions taken by the county during the
prior eight year period, which it claimed satisfied the exemption require-
ments of the Act.72
Oceanic contended that (1) a vested right to continue should be rec-
ognized where a specific plan has been approved by the applicable gov-
ernmental authority and actual development in reliance on the approval
has been commenced, and (2) that establishing a vested right on the basis
of a planned unit development approval was in the public interest and
was essential to achieve modem planning goals.73 The trial court re-
jected these arguments and held that Oceanic did not have a vested right
to complete the project in the absence of building permits.74 The trial
court's holding was later affirmed by the Court of Appeal.7"
3. The building permit and equitable estoppel
Raley v. California Tahoe Regional Planning Agency76 involved the
construction of a shopping center in Placer County, California."
Although subject to a number of conditions, including approval by re-
gional planning agencies, the developer in Raley had obtained prelimi-
nary development approval from the County.7 8 In accordance with the
preliminary approval, the developer sought all necessary regional plan-
70. Id. n.1, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 666 n.1. California Public Resources Code section 27404
provides:
If, prior to November 8, 1972, any city or county has issued a building permit, no
person who has obtained a vested right thereunder shall be required to secure a per-
mit from the regional commission; providing that no substantial changes may be
made in any such development, except in accordance with the provisions of this divi-
sion. Any such person shall be deemed to have such vested rights if, prior to Novem-
ber 8, 1972, he has in good faith and in reliance upon the building permit diligently
commenced construction and performed substantial work on the development and
incurred substantial liabilities for work and materials necessary therefor. Expenses
incurred in obtaining the enactment of an ordinance in relation to the particular
development or the issuance of a permit shall not be deemed liabilities for work or
material.
CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 27404.
71. Oceanic, 63 Cal. App. 3d at 61, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 666.
72. Id. at 61, 64, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 666, 668.
73. Id. at 65, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 669.
74. Id. at 65, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 668.
75. Id. at 69-70, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 671-72.
76. 68 Cal. App. 3d 965, 137 Cal. Rptr. 699 (1977).
77. Id. at 970, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 702.
78. Id. at 972, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 703.
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ning agency approvals. 79 The approvals were issued with reference to a
specific plan of development, including a plan for the construction of off-
site improvements.8" Prior to obtaining the final building permits, but in
reliance upon a land use permit it had already obtained, Raley spent ap-
proximately $150,000.81 Soon thereafter, the California Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency (the Agency), one of the agencies that had granted its
approval already, sought to revoke the approval and conduct a further
review. The trial court accepted Raley's reliance on the theory of equi-
table estoppel and denied the Agency's attempts at revocation.83 The
court of appeal overturned the trial court and held that Raley had not
fulfilled the prerequisites necessary to establish a vested right.84 The
Raley court acknowledged the suggestion in Avco that a developer might
acquire a vested right short of the issuance of a building permit if the
preliminary approvals provide the same degree of specificity to a project
as the paramaters of a building permit would.8 Nevertheless, the court
concluded that, based on the elements present in Raley, no estoppel arose
under the "building permit-equivalent" theory suggested in Avco. 6
4. Prohibiting subsequent phases
In Court House Plaza Co. v. City of Palo Alto,8 7 the developer had its
real property rezoned as a planned community district88 so that it could
construct an office building and parking structure in two phases. 89 The
first phase consisted of a four-story office building over a two-level park-
ing structure.9" In the second phase, the developer intended to construct
an additional six stories to the office building and to make additional
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 984, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 711.
82. Id. at 972-73, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 703-04.
83. Id. at 974, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 704-05.
84. Id. at 977, 986, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 707, 712.
85. Id. at 975 n.5, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 705 n.5.
86. Id. at 978, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 707.
87. 117 Cal. App. 3d 871, 173 Cal. Rptr. 161, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1074 (1981).
88. A Planned Community Zoning District is a special zoning classification conceptually
approved by the applicable city council. In order to receive such a zoning classification, the
developer must provide the city council with a detailed project plan that benefits the commu-
nity at large. Once approved, the developer has the city's blessing to construct the developer's
planned development in accordance with the developer's conceptual plan. A Planned Com-
munity Zoning District can only be altered or amended by a specific zoning change passed by
the appropriate city council. See, eg., Palo Alto, Cal. Municipal Code ch. 18.68 (1967 & rev.
Oct. 1986).
89. Court House Plaza, 117 Cal. App. 3d at 878, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 162-63.
90. Id., 173 Cal. Rptr. at 162.
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improvements to the parking structure.91 The developer had received all
of the necessary permits and approvals and had completed all of the
phase-one office building improvements. 92 In anticipation of completing
the phase-two improvements, the developer expended $450,000 for the
construction of the necessary foundation support and incurred an addi-
tional $500,000 in preparatory expenses.93
After the first phase was completed and the developer had incurred
these additional phase-two expenses, a 50-foot building height restriction
was enacted which affected all buildings in the city of Palo Alto, Califor-
nia, except those in planned community districts.94 Palo Alto subse-
quently rejected the developer's request to extend its development plan,
and also refused to issue a building permit because the proposed phase-
two additions failed to comply with then-existing building codes.95 The
court held that the improvements constructed by the developer in antici-
pation of its second phase did not provide the developer with any vested
right to complete phase two in accordance with the originally approved
development plan.9 6 The developer was simply penalized for incurring
the additional preparatory costs prior to issuance of a building permit for
phase two.
5. The building permit requirement one step further
The California Supreme Court in Pardee Construction Co. v. City of
Camarillo97 expanded on the Avco, 98 Oceanic,99 Raley,o° and Court
House Plaza 101 decisions. In Pardee, the City of Camarillo, California
(City) and Pardee Construction Company (Pardee) entered into a stipu-
lated judgment after Pardee sued the City for passing growth control
ordinances that reduced the permissible density on the relevant prop-
erty." 2 Prior to passing the ordinances, the City had approved Pardee's
91. Id.
92. Id. at 879-80, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 162-63.
93. Id. at 885, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 167.
94. Id. at 878, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 163.
95. Id. at 878-79, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 163.
96. Id. at 885, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 167.
97. 37 Cal. 3d 465, 690 P.2d 701, 208 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1984).
98. 17 Cal. 3d 785, 553 P.2d 546, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1976), cert denied, 429 U.S. 1083
(1977). See supra text accompanying notes 36-59.
99. 63 Cal. App. 3d 57, 133 Cal. Rptr. 664 (1976), cert denied, 431 U.S. 951 (1977). See
supra text accompanying notes 60-75.
100. 68 Cal. App. 3d 965, 137 Cal. Rptr. 699 (1977). See supra text accompanying notes
76-86.
101. 117 Cal. App. 3d 871, 173 Cal. Rptr. 161, cert denied, 454 U.S. 1074 (1981). See
supra text accompanying notes 87-96.
102. Pardee, 37 Cal. 3d at 468, 690 P.2d at 703, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 229.
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master plan, annexed the tract, and zoned the tract to permit develop-
ment consistent with the master plan.103 The judgment provided that (1)
Pardee had "a vested right to proceed with the development of all of the
[p]roperty" in conformity with the approved master plan and zoning;
and (2) the City of Camarillo was "estopped" from enacting land use
regulations "inconsistent" with the master plan and zoning. 104
In 1981, after the parties had entered into the stipulated judgment,
the City adopted another growth control ordinance limiting the total
number of building permits to be issued each year. 105 The ordinance, if
applied to Pardee, would have significantly affected its contemplated pro-
ject.106 After spending approximately $14,000,000 in connection with
the development, Pardee filed suit seeking an order establishing that the
ordinance should be inapplicable to its project. Pardee claimed that it
had previously acquired a vested right under the stipulated judgment to
proceed with its development in accordance with the previously ap-
proved master plan and zoning. 1 7
The trial court denied Pardee's request without opinion.10 8 The
California Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the growth control ordi-
nance did not violate Pardee's vested right to complete its development
in accordance with the master plan and zoning, but merely affected the
"timing" of Pardee's development.109 Pardee effectively allows a govern-
ment to control a developer's timing of the construction and ultimate
completion of a project, thereby permitting a government to directly af-
fect the overall economic viability of a proposed development.
The California Supreme Court has yet to address the issue of the
potential conflict between a Development Agreement and subsequently
enacted land use controls.110 One must consider whether Pardee indi-
103. Id., 690 P.2d at 703, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 229-30.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 470, 690 P.2d at 704, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 231.
106. Id. at 473, 690 P.2d at 706, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 233.
107. Id. at 467-68, 690 P.2d at 702, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 229.
108. Id. at 466-67 & n.1, 690 P.2d at 702 & n.1, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 228-29 & n.l.
109. Id. at 472-73, 690 P.2d at 706, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 233. The court explained:
The Growth Control Ordinance is essentially a regulation of the time, or rate, of
development. It regulates the rate of development by limiting the number of dwell-
ing units that may be built per year. It allocates the number of units among develop-
ers according to engineering and aesthetic criteria that, on their face, do not deprive
Pardee of its right to build the units contemplated by the consent judgment. It does
not change zoning and does not alter the master plan and therefore does not restrict
or prevent Pardee from its development of the property in accordance with the
master plan and the zoning provided by Ordinance No. 178.
Id.
110. See infra text accompanying notes 200-66.
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cates that the California Supreme Court will determine that a subse-
quently adopted ordinance falls short of violating the "vested rights" of a
developer based on a Development Agreement, notwithstanding the fact
that new conditions imposed on a developer to obtain building permits
increase the time and expense of a project substantially. 1
6. Equitable estoppel with respect to related permits
California case law suggests that once a building permit has been
obtained and the developer has relied upon it to its material detriment,
the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be asserted by the developer to
prevent a government agency from denying the issuance of related per-
mits. 12 For example, in Stanson v. San Diego Coast Regional Commis-
sion, I" the developer wanted to remodel a portion of a building that had
been used previously for storage and restaurant purposes." 4 The build-
ing was on property in the coastal zone and was within the San Diego
Coast Regional Commission's (Commission) jurisdiction. I 5 The devel-
oper contacted the Commission before it obtained a building permit and
was advised that a coastal development permit was not necessary to con-
vert the storage space. 1 6 The developer received a valid building permit
from the City of San Diego and completed more than ninety percent of
the necessary renovation work.117 Although the developer had relied on
the issuance of the building permit when it commenced the project, the
Commission informed the developer later that a coastal development per-
mit would, in fact, be required. 18 Apprised of this new fact, the devel-
oper applied for, and was denied, the coastal development permit.119
The developer then sought a writ of mandate to require the Commission
to issue the permit.120 The trial court held in favor of the Commis-
sion. 121 The court of appeal reversed, and remanded the case to the trial
111. See supra text accompanying notes 97-110.
112. See, eg., Santa Monica Pines Ltd. v. Rent Control Bd., 35 Cal. 3d 858, 679 P.2d 27,
201 Cal. Rptr. 593 (1984); Monterey Sand Co. v. California Coastal Comm'n, 191 Cal. App.
3d 169, 236 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1987); South Cent. Coast Regional Comm'n v. Charles A. Pratt
Constr. Co., 128 Cal. App. 3d 830, 180 Cal. Rptr. 555 (1982); Billings v. California Coastal
Comm'n, 103 Cal. App. 3d 729, 163 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1980); Patterson v. Central Coast Re-
gional Coastal Zone Conservation Comm'n, 58 Cal. App. 3d 833, 130 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1976).
113. 101 Cal. App. 3d 38, 161 Cal. Rptr. 392 (1980).
114. Id. at 41, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 394.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 42, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 395.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 42-43, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 395-96.
120. Id. at 43, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 396.
121. Id. at 43-44, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 396.
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court. 122 The court of appeal instructed the trial court to apply the doc-
trine of equitable estoppel to determine whether the developer had ac-
quired a vested right to complete the renovation. 123 The trial court was
instructed to consider (1) the material work that had been undertaken;
and (2) the substantial costs the developer had incurred by relying on the
receipt of a valid building permit and on the representation of a staff
member of the Commission that a coastal development permit would not
be required. 24 The appellate court recited its understanding of the equi-
table estoppel doctrine with regard to the land use context as follows:
"[A]n owner of property acquires a vested right to construct a building
where the conduct of the government amounts to a representation that
such construction is fully approved and legal, and in reliance on such
representation the owner materially changes position."' 25
The Stanson decision implies that once a building permit is issued by
a local government entity, a subsequent local governing body may be
estopped from claiming that a related, albeit independent, permit must be
obtained if the developer has reasonably and materially relied to its detri-
ment on the prior conduct of the first local government agency.126
In two recent decisions, Halaco Engineering Co. v. South Central
Coast Regional Commission 27 and Monterey Sand Co. v. California
Coastal Commission,2 ' the California courts have taken Stanson one step
further. In Halaco, an engineering company claimed that it had acquired
a vested right to continue making improvements on an industrial silta-
tion pond. 129 The company, in building the plant and the related silta-
tion pond, had relied on the representations of local officials that no
grading permit or any other permit would be required.1 30 The company
claimed that there was no need to obtain a coastal development permit,
notwithstanding the fact that no grading or other local permit had been
actually procured for the pond itself.' 3 1 The California Supreme Court
agreed with the company. 132 The court based its holding on the trial
court's finding that the local government knew when it issued permits for
the related plant that the improvement and periodic enlargement of the
122. Id. at 51, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 400.
123. Id. at 49-51, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 399-400.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 49, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 399.
126. Id.
127. 42 Cal. 3d 52, 720 P.2d 15, 227 Cal. Rptr. 669 (1986).
128. 191 Cal. App. 3d 169, 236 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1987).
129. Halaco, 42 Cal. 3d at 56-57, 720 P.2d at 17, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 669.
130. Id. at 76 n.21, 720 P.2d at 30 n.21, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 682 n.21.
131. Id. at 59, 720 P.2d at 18-19, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 670.
132. Id. at 76, 720 P.2d at 31, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 682.
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siltation pond was an important part of the plant's operation. 133
In Monterey, the court of appeal applied the doctrine of equitable
estoppel and held that a sand mining company had acquired a vested
right to continue to mine in connection with a 1968 state lease. 134 The
State of California granted a mineral lease to Monterey Sand in 1968 as
the result of a litigation settlement.13 5 Monterey Sand gave up its claim
of right and title to the subject property in exchange for the grant from
the State of the right to continue its existing sand extraction operations
for forty years. 136 The lease did not condition the right to continue ex-
traction operations on the acquisition of a federal permit. 137 A vested
right was found despite the fact that the company had failed to obtain a
required federal permit prior to the effective date of the Conservation
Act. 138 The court of appeal found that all necessary authorizations from
the State were acquired by virtue of the lease and further found that "the
state agency responsible for protection of the state's interest in public
lands" had made the promises in question. 139 The court decided that the
state's acquiescence in Monterey Sand's continued extraction activities
with knowledge that it was possible that a federal permit might be re-
quired estopped the state from later relying on the lack of the permit to
assert coastal act permit jurisdiction over Monterey Sand."4 The court
concluded that it would be difficult to envision a stronger case for appli-
cation of estoppel principles than the unique facts presented by this
case. 141
Reliance on a building permit satisfies one element of the vested
rights rule only if the building permit is valid in all respects. 142 Califor-
nia case law indicates that if a government agency wrongfully withholds
a permit, or if a developer relies on the issuance of a permit that is later
found to have been issued improperly, the developer is usually not enti-
tled to any form of relief.143 A vested right is not created regardless of
133. Id. at 75-76, 720 P.2d at 30, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 682.
134. Monterey, 191 Cal. App. 3d at 177-78, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
135. Id. at 177, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 176, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 319. When the Conservation Act went into effect, it
required certain coastal development permits. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §§ 27000-27650.
139. Id. at 177, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
140. Id. at 178, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 321.
141. Id. at 177, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
142. See, e.g., Strong v. County of Santa Cruz, 15 Cal. 3d 720, 543 P.2d 264, 125 Cal. Rptr.
896 (1975); California Tahoe Regional Planning Agency v. Day and Night Elec., Inc., 163 Cal.
App. 3d 898, 210 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1985).
143. See, e.g., Strong, 15 Cal. 3d at 725, 543 P.2d at 266-67, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 898-99;
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the extent of work performed by a developer or the amount of liabilities
incurred. 44
For example, in California Central Coast Regional Coastal Zone
Conservation Commission v. McKeon Construction,141 the California
Court of Appeal determined that the City of Capitola, California frus-
trated the developer's attempts to obtain a building permit.1 46 During
the pendency of the dispute, the Conservation Act 147 went into effect and
was applicable to the area where the condominium development was to
be located. 4 The developer tried to persuade the court that had the
building permit not been arbitrarily denied at the outset, it would have
performed sufficient work to establish a vested right prior to the effective
date of the Conservation Act, and would have completed construction
free of the Conservation Act's requirements.149 Nonetheless, the court of
appeal held that the developer had failed to acquire a vested right to
proceed with the project.150 The court reasoned that the developer was
subject to the Conservation Act's requirements because it had failed to
perform substantial work in reliance upon a valid building permit prior
to the effective date of the Act. 15
1
C. The Substantial Expenditure Aspect
In California, a developer must not only obtain a valid building per-
mit in order to acquire a vested right, but must also perform substantial
work and incur substantial liabilities in good faith reliance on the per-
mit. 152 Early case law held that for a vested right to be established, only
a small amount of work had to be performed.1 53 In the 1958 case of
Kissinger v. City of Los Angeles,154 the court concluded that the plaintiff
People v. County of Kern, 39 Cal. App. 3d 830, 115 Cal. Rptr. 67 (1974); Pettitt v. City of
Fresno, 34 Cal. App. 3d 813, 110 Cal. Rptr. 262 (1973).
144. See sources cited supra note 143.
145. 38 Cal. App. 3d 154, 112 Cal. Rptr. 903 (1974).
146. Id. at 160, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 907.
147. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §§ 27000-27650.
148. McKeon, 38 Cal. App. 3d at 161, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 907.
149. Id. at 159, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 906.
150. Id. at 160, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 907.
151. Id. at 159, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 906.
152. See, eg., Halaco Eng'g Co. v. South Cent. Coast Regional Comm'n, 42 Cal. 3d 52, 720
P.2d at 15, 227 Cal. Rptr. 667 (1986); Santa Monica Pines, Ltd. v. Rent Control Bd., 35 Cal.
3d 858, 679 P.2d 27, 201 Cal. Rptr. 593 (1984); Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South
Coast Regional Comm'n, 17 Cal. 3d 785, 533 P.2d 546, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1083 (1977).
153. See, eg., Griffin v. County of Marin, 157 Cal. App. 2d 507, 321 P.2d 148 (1958);
Trans-Oceanic Oil Corp. v. City of Santa Barbara, 85 Cal. App. 2d 776, 194 P.2d 148 (1948).
154. 161 Cal. App. 2d 454, 327 P.2d 10 (1958).
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had acquired a vested right to complete construction of several apart-
ment buildings after the plaintiff had incurred approximately $2,300 in
expenses performing preliminary work."'5
In a recent California case, Highland Development Co. v. City of Los
Angeles,156 the court found that the amount of money spent in reliance
on the building permit must be measured according to the total scope of
the work authorized by the building permit.15 7 In Highland, the City of
Los Angeles issued a driveway permit to the plaintiff who immediately
completed the driveway at a total cost of $1,000.158 After the work was
finished, the city revoked the plaintiff's building permit.15 9 The court
ruled in favor of the plaintiff because the extent of the work that had
been performed was substantial in relation to the scope of the construc-
tion authorized by the building permit."6 The court stated that it had
"no hesitation . . . that such work and expenditures, even if small in
absolute terms, could constitute substantial reliance sufficient to create a
vested right in the driveway permit."
1 61
Another California decision, however, creates a degree of uncer-
tainty in trying to determine the meaning of "substantial." In Santa
Monica Pines, Ltd. v. Rent Control Board,62 the developer claimed that
it had acquired a vested right to convert apartment units into condomin-
ium units free from the constraints of a newly enacted rent control ordi-
nance.1 6 The developer based its assertion on the expenditures it had
made in reliance upon a tentative map that had been approved before the
rent control ordinance was adopted. 16 The California Supreme Court
held that the developer's payment of $42,000 for a condominium license
fee after the rent control ordinance was adopted failed to constitute rea-
sonable reliance by the developer.1 65 Instead, the court decided that the
developer had simply taken a "calculated risk."1 66 The court held fur-
ther that to be considered part of a substantial expenditure, the money
155. Id. at 463, 327 P.2d at 16-17.
156. 170 Cal. App. 3d 169, 215 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1985).
157. Id. at 187, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 892.
158. Id. at 174, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 883.
159. Id. at 175-76, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 883-84.
160. Id. at 187, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 892.
161. Id. at 188 (footnote omitted).
162. 35 Cal. 3d 858, 679 P.2d 27, 201 Cal. Rptr. 593 (1984).
163. Id. at 864, 679 P.2d at 30-31, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 596-97.
164. Id. at 864-65, 679 P.2d at 31, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 597. Approximately $47,000 of the
total projected cost had been budgeted to cover governmental fees payable at the time the final
map was recorded. Id. at 867-68, 679 P.2d at 33, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 599.
165. Id. at 867, 679 P.2d at 33, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 599.
166. Id. (citing Spindler Realty Corp. v. Monning, 243 Cal. App. 2d 255, 53 Cal. Rptr. 7,
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 975 (1966)).
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must be spent after the permit or other entitlements are issued and before
the change in law occurs that affects the development. 167 The court also
determined that the developer's expenditure of over $1,000 prior to the
enactment of the rent control ordinance and in reliance on the tentative
map, failed to constitute a "substantial" percentage of the total projected
cost of $60,000 to complete the condominium conversion.16 8
In Cooper v. County of Los Angeles,169 which was decided prior to
Santa Monica Pines, the court set forth two alternative tests to use in
determining whether the expenditures made and liabilities incurred by a
developer are "substantial." 1 70 If the development is relatively small, the
"percentage comparison test" is used.1 71 In applying the percentage
comparison test, the court compares on a percentage basis the amount of
liability incurred and construction performed with the total cost of the
project. If the percentage is substantial, the developer acquires a vested
right.' 72 When the development is large, the "quantitatively substantial
test" is used.1 73 Under this theory, the court looks at the total amount
actually expended and the total amount of liability incurred, without
considering total development costs.174 As with the percentage compari-
son test, if the total amounts are substantial, a developer may acquire a
vested right to complete the project as approved.1 75 The proposed sub-
stantiality tests, however, fail to provide much guidance since the assess-
ment of expenditures and liabilities remains subjective.
176
To determine whether work performed and money spent are sub-
stantial, courts often distinguish "soft" costs from "hard" costs.177
"Soft" costs include the cost of land acquired as well as costs related to
architectural and engineering fees. 178 "Hard" costs consist of costs for
physical improvements to the land, and the material and labor costs for
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. 69 Cal. App. 3d 529, 138 Cal. Rptr. 229 (1977).






176. The court offered no concrete percentage guidelines against which to assess
"substantiality."
177. See, eg., Raley v. California Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 68 Cal. App. 3d 965,
137 Cal. Rptr. 699 (1977); Highland Dev. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 170 Cal. App. 3d 169,
215 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1985); see also H. MILLER & M. STARR, CURRENT LAW OF CALIFORNIA
REAL ESTATE § 24:54A (1978 & Supp. 1987).
178. .Raley, 68 Cal. App. 3d at 985-86, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 712.
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the structures that will be constructed on the property. 179 A major
shortcoming of the Cooper tests is that "soft" costs are excluded when
assessing whether the expenditures are substantial.18 0 For developers,
however, both types of costs represent "dollars of equal hardness." '
The "substantial expenditure" criteria were also addressed in British
and Continental Development Corp. v. City of Los Angeles." 2 The trial
court held that the developer had successfully established a vested right
to complete construction of an office tower because it had spent approxi-
mately $18,000 preparing for construction.1 8 3 The trial court held fur-
ther that even if the $18,000 spent for site grading and demolition of
existing structures could not be considered substantial, the $1,300,000
value of the demolished improvements, taken with the $18,000, was
substantial.
1 4
The court of appeal affirmed. 185 The court ruled that because the
developer previously had obtained a building permit relating to its pro-
ject, the trial court was justified in including in its analysis the original
value of the demolished building. 8 6 The court of appeal held that since
the developer had acted in good faith, performed substantial work, and
had procured a building permit authorizing the construction of the pro-
posed office building, it acquired a vested right to perform construction
free from the effects of the traffic control ordinance at issue.
187
The trial court's analysis in British and Continental Development
Corp. seems to depart from the current trend of cases.188 The trial court
took into account the "soft" cost of the value of the demolished build-
ing.18 9 The decision illustrates how difficult it is to predict precisely
which costs will be considered by a court and whether the total amounts
expended will be deemed to be "substantial."
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 986, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 712.
182. No. C 582016 (Los Angeles Super. Ct., Apr. 4, 1986), statement of decision at 4, aff'd,
No. B 021742 (Cal. App. Ct., 2d Dist., Div. 4, Apr. 17, 1987).
183. Id. at 2.
184. Id. at 4.
185. British and Continental Dev. Corp., No. B 021742 (Cal. App Ct., 2d Dist., Div. 4, Apr.
17, 1987).
186. Id.
187. Id. at 7-8.
188. See supra notes 156-81 and accompanying text.
189. British and Continental Dev. Corp., No. C 582016 (Los Angeles Super. Ct., Apr. 4,
1986), statement of decision at 4.
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D. Good Faith Reliance
The third element in determining whether a developer has obtained
a vested right to complete a project is the prerequisite that the developer
perform work and expend money in good faith reliance upon the grant of
a permit. 190 If work is performed without a permit when one is required,
this work is considered to be illegal and not performed in good faith.191
The expenditures associated with illegal work are not considered in de-
termining whether the developer has acquired a vested right. 92 More-
over, if the developer anticipates that a change in the law will occur, and
proceeds to complete work in an abnormally hasty manner to maximize
construction prior to the anticipated change, courts have held that the
good faith reliance requirement is not met.
93
The Hawaii case of County of Kauai v. Pacific Standard Life Insur-
ance Co. 194 illustrates this situation. In Pacific Standard, after a rezoning
of the developer's property was approved and after building permits were
issued, the developer incurred substantial construction expenses. 95 Af-
ter the rezoning, but before the issuance of building permits, a referen-
dum petition was executed and the rezoning was placed on the ballot for
the upcoming election. 19 6 The election was held three months after the
issuance of the first building permit and the rezoning of the property was
repealed. 97 The court held that the developer did not acquire a vested
right. 98 The developer's reliance was not in "good faith" because it
knew that the referendum petition and the forthcoming election might
change the zoning classification. 199 The Pacific Standard decision ap-
pears to send a strong message to developers: developers may not rely on
a permit until all potential, known contests of that permit are resolved.
190. Russian Hill Improvement Ass'n v. Board of Permit Appeals, 66 Cal. 2d 34, 423 P.2d
824, 56 Cal. Rptr. 672 (1967); Tosh v. California Coastal Comm'n, 99 Cal. App. 3d 388, 160
Cal. Rptr. 170 (1979); Raley v. California Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 68 Cal. App. 3d
965, 137 Cal. Rptr. 699 (1977); Oceanic Cal., Inc. v. North Cent. Coast Regional Comm'n, 63
Cal. App. 3d 57, 133 Cal. Rptr. 664 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 951 (1977); Aries Dev. Co. v.
California Coastal Zone Conservation Comm'n, 48 Cal. App. 3d 534, 122 Cal. Rptr. 315
(1975).
191. Tosh, 99 Cal. App. 3d at 396, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 175; Aries, 48 Cal. App. 3d at 550, 122
Cal. Rptr. at 326.
192. See sources cited supra note 191.
193. Russian Hill, 66 Cal. 2d at 39, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 677; Aries, 48 Cal. App. 3d at 549, 122
Cal. Rptr. at 325-26.
194. 65 Haw. 318, 653 P.2d 766 (1982).
195. Id. at 320, 653 P.2d at 770-71, 777.
196. Id. at 321, 653 P.2d at 770.
197. Id. at 327, 653 P.2d at 771.
198. Id. at 326, 653 P.2d at 779.
199. Id. at 326, 653 P.2d at 777-78.
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III. THE DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT AND
VESTING TENTATIVE MAP
Over the past decade, several statutes have been enacted that pur-
port to limit the power of local agencies to apply newly enacted ordi-
nances to ongoing development projects.2" Principal among these are
the Development Agreement legislation of 1979201 and the Vesting Ten-
tative Map legislation of 1984.202
The California legislature enacted the Development Agreement leg-
islation 203 and the Vesting Tentative Map legislation 2° in response to the
difficulties that developers of long-range, multi-phased projects had en-
countered as a result of the judicially developed vested rights doctrine.
Both pieces of legislation were passed in an attempt to provide developers
with the statutory equivalent of a vested right.
A. Development Agreements
A Development Agreement is a contract between a local govern-
ment and a developer which delineates the terms of a developer's pro-
posed project. In enacting the Development Agreement legislation of
1979, the California legislature explained:
(a) The lack of certainty in the approval of development
projects can result in a waste of resources, escalate the cost of
housing and other development to the consumer, and discour-
age investment in and commitment to comprehensive planning
which would make maximum efficient utilization of resources
at the least economic cost to the public.
(b) Assurance to the applicant for a development project that
upon approval of the project, the applicant may proceed with
the project in accordance with existing policies, rules and regu-
lations, and subject to conditions of approval, will strengthen
the public planning process, encourage private participation in
comprehensive planning, and reduce the economic costs of
development.2 °5
The legislation was intended both to preserve local government control
over development projects and to give developers the opportunity to
200. See generally Sigg, California's Development Agreement Statute, 15 Sw. U.L. REv. 695
(1985).
201. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65864-65869.5 (West 1983 & Supp. 1988).
202. Id. §§ 66498.1-66498.9 (West Supp. 1988).
203. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65864-65869.5 (West 1983 & Supp. 1988).
204. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 66498.1-66498.9 (West Supp. 1988).
205. Id. § 65864 (West 1983 & Supp. 1988).
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specify the parameters of a project in one undertaking before construc-
tion is started.z 6 Further, the legislation was aimed at providing a devel-
oper with some assurance, at the time resources are commited to a
project, that the developer will be entitled to complete a project as ap-
proved.20 7 The Development Agreement legislation also fulfills the public
need to alleviate haphazard land regulation schemes that burden smaller,
less integrated development projects, and to provide for comprehensive
long-term planning and land use regulation for major developments.
1. Provisions of the Development Agreement legislation
Pursuant to California Government Code sections 65864-65869.5, a
local government agency may, but is not required to, enter into a Devel-
opment Agreement with a property owner as a means to guide the devel-
opment of the property.08 Unless otherwise provided in the
Development Agreement the rules, regulations, and official policies gov-
erning permitted uses, design, density, improvement and construction of
the proposed project consist of those that are in effect when the Develop-
ment Agreement is fully executed. 0 9
A city or county has the right to enter into a Development Agree-
ment with the legal or equitable owner of any property; however, the city
or county must comply with the requirements of any local ordinance that
has been enacted pursuant to the Development Agreement legislation.2"'
The Development Agreement legislation requires each local government
to enact an ordinance outlining the procedures and requirements applica-
ble to Development Agreements. 2 "
The local ordinance must include: (1) a requirement that the Devel-
opment Agreement be reviewed at least once a year; and (2) at the yearly
review, the developer has the burden of proving its "good faith compli-
ance with the terms of the agreement."2"2 At the yearly review, if the
local agency determines, on the basis of adequate proof, that the devel-
oper has failed to comply in good faith with the covenants and obliga-
tions of the Development Agreement, the local agency may either modify
or terminate the Development Agreement.213
The Development Agreement itself must specify "the duration of
206. Id. § 65864(b).
207. Id.
208. Id. §§ 65864-65869.5.
209. Id. § 65866.
210. Id. § 65865.
211. Id. § 65865(c).
212. Id. § 65865.1.
213. Id.
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the agreement, the permitted uses of the property, the density or inten-
sity of use, the maximum height and size of proposed buildings, and pro-
visions for reservation or dedication of land for public purposes." '14 It
may also include terms and limitations applying to subsequent discre-
tionary government action, provided that such terms and limitations do
not impair the use or density of the property, or the intensity of develop-
ment as specified in the Development Agreement."1 ' The Development
Agreement may also specify the time frame when construction of the
development shall be commenced and completed, 1 6 and may also in-
lude covenants and conditions relating to financing the required public
facilities. 17 If the land is within the California Coastal Zone, the Devel-
opment Agreement must be approved by the California Coastal Zone
Commission. 18
If a Development Agreement is adequately specific when adopted, it
can solve many of the problems faced by a developer under the judicially
formulated vested rights doctrine. A Development Agreement will be
valid, as approved, regardless of any subsequent changes in the general
plan, zoning, subdivision or building regulations of the city or county.219
Therefore, the developer can proceed under the approved Development
Agreement subject only to regulations that are in effect when the Devel-
opment Agreement is executed. It must be noted, however, that a Devel-
opment Agreement is subject to any subsequently enacted federal or state
laws.
220
2. Why enter into a Development Ageement?
Without the protections and benefits of a Development Agreement
(or a Vesting Tentative Map), a developer in California has little assur-
ance that it will be permitted to complete a project as designed. 22 1 A
Development Agreement protects developers who expend significant
amounts of money in the early stages of a project.
214. Id. § 65865.2. Unlike the Vesting Tenative Tract Map, the term of a Development
Agreement is not limited by statute. Id. § 65865.2. Cf Id. §§ 66452.6, 66498.1 (West 1983 &
Supp. 1988) (providing the prescribed duration of the vesting attributes of a VTM).
215. Id. § 65865.2.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. §§ 65867.5, 65869 (West 1983 & Supp. 1988).
219. Id. § 65866.
220. Id. § 65869.5 (West 1983 & Supp. 1988). A Development Agreement is recorded once
it has been approved. Id. § 65868.5. It is then enforceable by the parties and by any succes-
sors and assigns. Id. After recording, the Development Agreement can be amended or can-
celled only with the consent of the parties or of any successors or assigns. Id. § 65868.
221. See supra text accompanying notes 34-199.
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In Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Com-
mission,2 the California Supreme Court essentially eliminated the pro-
tection of the doctrine of equitable estoppel for developers and
substituted in its place the "building permit" requirement discussed
above.223 Avco provides an insignificant degree of security for a devel-
oper who expends material costs at the inception of a project. Since a
developer must prove substantial expenditures and good faith reliance on
a validly issued building permit, the seemingly clear holding of Avco
nonetheless exposes developers to vague standards and subjective deter-
minations of whether a vested right exists.224 Further, reliance on a
building permit cannot provide a developer with a vested right that is
broader than the specified scope of the permit. For example, the fact that
a developer has graded its property pursuant to a validly issued grading
permit will not guarantee that the developer is entitled to complete the
project.225
From a local government perspective, the assurances provided by a
Development Agreement serve to avoid any potential "chilling effect" on
the growth of a vital real estate development market. A Development
Agreement also gives the developer the opportunity to demonstrate to
local government agencies that the proposed project is economically fea-
sible and that the development will not burden the public. Local govern-
ment agencies benefit further from Development Agreements because the
agreements can be structured to require developers to conform to well-
defined parameters. A Development Agreement can specify that im-
provements must be completed within an established time frame and in a
prescribed fashion. Finally, as discussed in Part IV,226 a Development
Agreement may provide a contractual basis for certain expenditures
made by a developer and thus may enable a local government to circum-
vent the requirement that a nexus must exist between a land use condi-
tion and the burden being imposed, under the recent United States
Supreme Court decision in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission.227
3. Enforceability of Development Agreements
At first blush, the Development Agreement appears to establish a
procedure whereby a developer can securely proceed with the substantial
222. 17 Cal. 3d 785, 553 P.2d 546, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1083
(1977); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65868.
223. See supra notes 36-59 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
226. See infra notes 284-438 and accompanying text.
227. 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987); see infra notes 367-99 and accompanying text.
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expenditure of funds at the outset of a multi-phase project. There re-
mains, however, the significant question of whether the agreements will
be enforced by the courts.22 8 Land use regulations and procedures relat-
ing to the development and improvement of property are within the po-
lice power of local government.22 9 Since a Development Agreement is
binding not only on the current governing body, but also on its succes-
sors,230 an argument can be made that by entering into a Development
Agreement, the present governing body deprives any future governing
bodies from exercising their inherent police powers.
It is settled California law that a government may not contract away
its future right to exercise its police power.231 In many instances in
which local agencies and developers have attempted to enter into long-
term agreements relating to future developments, the courts have invali-
dated these attempts and declared them unenforceable.232 Therefore, the
inherent benefit of the Development Agreement as a method by which to
avoid the effect of subsequent changes in the law that are detrimental to a
developer is still questionable. One can still argue, however, that en-
forcement of a Development Agreement does not deprive a future gov-
ernment body of its regulatory discretion or its police powers. A
Development Agreement deals specifically with the problems and issues
properly considered by a local governing agency in the exercise of its
police power. Thus, when a governing agency enters into an agreement,
it can be viewed as the agency's exercise of its current police power re-
garding those specific issues rather than an abdication of the local
agency's exercise of its future police power.
Further, the Development Agreement legislation has certain built-in
protections for government entities. First, the legislation requires peri-
odic review of all Development Agreements.233 Second, the legislation
228. See infra note 232 and accompanying text.
229. The term police power "connotes the time-tested conceptiona limit of public en-
croachment upon private interests." Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594
(1962). The Supreme Court in Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894), explained that in order
to be a permissible use of police power, the state must show "first, that the interests of the
public... require such interference; and, second, that the means are reasonably necessary for
accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals." Id. at 137.
230. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65868.5 (West 1983 & Supp. 1988).
231. See, e.g., Delucchi v. County of Santa Cruz, 179 Cal. App. 3d 814, 823-24, 225 Cal.
Rptr. 43, 48-49, cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 46 (1986).
232. Caminetti v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 22 Cal. 2d 344, 139 P.2d 908 (1943); Acker v.
Baldwin, 18 Cal. 2d 341, 15 P.2d 455 (1941); McNeil v. City of South Pasadena, 166 Cal. 153,
135 P. 32 (1913); Laurel Hill Cemetery v. City and County of San Francisco, 152 Cal. 464, 93
P. 70 (1907); Scrutton v. County of Sacramento, 275 Cal. App. 2d 412, 79 Cal. Rptr. 872
(1969).
233. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65865.1.
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expressly recognizes that a local government can adopt and implement
new regulations and policies which do not conflict with the regulations
and policies that are applicable to the property covered by a Develop-
ment Agreement.234 Finally, the legislation requires a Development
Agreement to be consistent with applicable specific and general plans.235
4. The Development Agreement in a slow-growth environment
In today's slow-growth climate, developers are concerned about the
viability of Development Agreements in light of the numerous "slow-
growth" or "growth-management" initiatives and ordinances that have
been passed that have affected the areas in which projects are located.236
The concern is justified. In some cases, the slow-growth initiative could
be considered a "subsequently enacted law" that conflicts with the regu-
lations and policies that were applicable to the property when the Devel-
opment Agreement was entered into. In this case, a developer would be
entitled to finish the development according to the terms and provisions
of the Development Agreement, notwithstanding the provisions of the
new ordinance. In other cases, as in Pardee Construction Co. v. City of
Camarillo,237 the slow-growth law is considered to be a matter of "tim-
ing." If the Development Agreement does not specifically address "tim-
ing" or "slow-growth," the developer and the development may be
affected by the constraints of the new slow-growth ordinance.
B. Vesting Tenative Map
In 1984, the California legislature attempted to alleviate the uncer-
tainties surrounding the development process in California by further
amending the Subdivision Map Act to create a variation of the standard
tentative map.2 38 The legislature termed this new instrument a "Vesting
Tentative Map" (VTM). 239 This new legislation, which became effective
January 1, 1986 for residential developments, and January 1, 1988 for all
other developments,2 ° is based on the legislature's view that "[t]he pri-
234. Id. § 65866.
235. Id. §§ 65865.1, 65866.
236. For example, in the November 8, 1988 California elections, the following cities ap-
proved slow-growth initiatives: Chino, Costa Mesa, San Juan Capistrano, and Chula Vista.
See also, CAMARILLO, CAL., MUN. CODE, ch. 20, §§ 20.01.04, 20.01.05 (1981); THOUSAND
OAKS, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE, ch. 10, Measure A (1980).
237. 37 Cal. 3d 465, 690 P.2d 701, 208 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1984). See supra notes 97-111 and
accompanying text.
238. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 66498.1-66498.9.
239. Id. § 66498.1.
240. Id. § 66498.7.
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vate sector should be able to rely upon an approved vesting tentative map
prior to expending resources and incurring liabilities without the risk of
having the project frustrated by subsequent action by the approving local
agency .... ,241
1. Provisions of the Vesting Tentative Map legislation
The legislation creating the VTM permits a developer to apply for a
VTM and requires the local government to process the application, even
if the project requires only a parcel map and the applicable ordinances do
not require a tentative map to be filed as a condition to the approval of a
final parcel map.242 According to the statute's terms, the use of a VTM
creates a type of vested right for the landowner.243 The VTM allows a
developer to proceed with a proposed development, including approved
land uses and construction of buildings and modifications of the land, in
substantial compliance with the local ordinances, policies and guidelines
that are in effect at the time the VTM is approved.2' Therefore, under
the legislation, a developer who files a VTM is entitled to all of its bene-
fits in any case where a tentative map or merely a parcel map is
required. 245
A VTM is filed and processed just like any other tentative map. It
must be conspicuously identified as a VTM on its face.24 6 The vested
rights acquired by a developer as a result of the approval of a VTM con-
tinue for a period provided by local ordinance. However, in the event a
final map is recorded, the vested rights survive for a period of not less
than one year, nor more than two years, after the final map is re-
corded.2 47 When a project is developed in several phases and more than
one map is recorded, these time periods start running from the date each
final map for each phase is recorded.2 4 8 It is important to note, however,
that all vested rights that are acquired under a VTM terminate if a final
map is not approved prior to the expiration of the VTM.2 49 In the event
that a completed application is not processed within thirty days of sub-
mission, the time periods described above are automatically extended for
a period of time equal to the processing time taken by the local agency
241. Id. § 66498.9(b).
242. Id. §§ 66428, 66498.1 (West Supp. 1988).
243. Id. § 66498.1(b).
244. Id. § 66498.1.
245. Id.; see also id. §§ 66428, 66463.5(g) (West 1983 & Supp. 1988).
246. Id. § 66452 (West 1983 & Supp. 1988).
247. Id. § 66452.6 (West 1983 & Supp. 1988).
248. Id.; see also id. § 66498.1.
249. Id. § 66498.1(d).
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after the developer files the completed application for a grading permit,
design review or architectural review.250 Moreover, the developer always
has the option of applying for an extension in order to comply with these
time periods.251
When a developer receives a building permit, the vested rights ac-
quired by the developer continue until the permit expires by its own
terms.252 When a parcel map is fied after a VTM, the time periods de-
scribed above apply except that the time periods start to run with the
recordation of the parcel map.253
2. Developer compliance
A developer is not excused from complying with local ordinances
and state laws just because it has filed a VTM, nor does a local agency
lose its authority to impose conditions on the approval of a VTM. 2 4 A
developer does, however, have the option of seeking an amendment to
the map once it has been approved.255 If a map is inconsistent with the
local zoning ordinances then in effect, the local agency can disapprove
the map or condition its approval upon a change in the zoning. In that
case, the developer does not acquire any vested rights until it complies
with the necessary zoning change.25 6
3. Limitations of the Vesting Tentative Map
There are some limitations on the vested rights that a developer ac-
quires by using a VTM. As in the case of the Development Agreement
legislation, the rights granted by a VTM "relate only to the imposition by
local agencies of conditions or requirements created and imposed by lo-
cal ordinances," and do "not grant local agencies the option to disregard
any state or federal laws, regulations, or policies."2 7 As a result, the
seemingly secure vested rights that are conferred statutorily by a VTM
can be rendered moot by the subsequent enactment of state or federal
land use regulations. Moreover, the vested rights that a developer ob-
tains can be defeated by local ordinances that are later enacted to protect
local residents from "a condition dangerous to their health or safety."25
250. Id. § 66452.6(g).
251. Id.
252. Id. § 66498.1(d); see also id. § 66452.6(h).
253. Id. § 66452.6(g).
254. Id. § 66498.6, 66498.1(e).
255. Id. § 66498.2.
256. Id. § 66498.3.
257. Id. § 66498.6(b).
258. Id. § 66498.1(c)(1).
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The VTM legislation does not provide a statutorily vested right to
proceed with a specifically definedproject, nor does the legislation require
that the proposed project be described in detail in the application for, or
as part of, the VTM. Instead, the legislation requires that the proposed
project be "in substantial compliance with [existing] ordinances, policies
and standards." '259 To the extent that the ordinances, policies and stan-
dards permit a local government to maintain a degree of discretion over a
developer after approval of the VTM,26° a developer is still exposed to
the risk of not being allowed to complete a project as designed. For ex-
ample, California Government Code section 66498.3(a) appears to allow
a local government to deny an application for a zoning change, despite
the fact that a zoning change will be required in order to complete the
proposed and so-called "approved" development covered by the VTM.261
There are other discretionary approvals that also might be required
after a VTM is approved. For example, a local governing body could try
to use its authority with respect to design reviews and conditional use
permits in an attempt to halt a development covered by a VTM. A pru-
dent developer, therefore, should describe the proposed subdivision as
precisely as possible in the VTM application and should not regard the
VTM as a substitute for a detailed Development Agreement.
Finally, the so-called vested rights conferred by the new VTM legis-
lation, which allow the developer to proceed with development in sub-
stantial compliance with the ordinances, policies and standards in effect
at the time the application for the VTM is filed, fails to insulate the devel-
oper from the subsequent enactment of growth control ordinances. This
was the case in Pardee Construction Co. v. City of Camarillo,262 in which
the California Supreme Court found that the subsequent land use con-
trols affected the timing or rate of the proposed project, but did not affect
the developer's ultimate right to complete the proposed development.263
Since the rights conferred by a VTM are not concrete, developers
should exercise great care before expending significant amounts of time
and money in reliance on a VTM's effectiveness. A developer may, in
fact, be required to incur substantial start-up costs to acquire, at best,
these quasi-vested rights, or at worst, to discover that the local govern-
ment is unwilling to perfect a developer's right to proceed with a project.
259. Id. § 66498.1(b).
260. Id. § 66498.1(e).
261. Id. § 66498.3(a).
262. 37 Cal. 3d 465, 690 P.2d at 701,208 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1984). See supra notes 97-111 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Pardee.
263. Id. at 472, 690 P.2d at 706, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 233.
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In short, local governments are armed with a potentially powerful
weapon to stop a developer's progress.
As a rule, local governments retain the right to exercise discretion
with respect to many, if not all, aspects of a proposed development even
if a VTM has been filed and approved.2 This right, coupled with the
fact that a VTM appears only to confer a vested right to develop property
for a specified period of time, has led several local governments to require
developers to provide all relevant and material information about a pro-
posed project when a VTM application is submitted.26 Further, some
local governments require developers to process substantial discretionary
land use approvals related to the proposed project prior to or along with
the submission of the VTM application.266 As developers are learning,
those local governments that are trying to discourage developers from
using VTM's to preserve their rights are, for example, requiring detailed
development plans, site plans, and landscaping plans in an effort to create
expensive and risky challenges for the developer. For this reason, devel-
opers who pursue projects in jurisdictions that disfavor or actively dis-
courage development should enter into a Development Agreement with
the community if that alternative is available.
C. VTM or Development Agreement?
There are material differences between a Development Agreement
and a VTM that may justify the use of both for some projects. In some
cases, it may be appropriate only to use one of the devices.
First, a local government is required to accept and process a
VTM.z67 A VTM must be processed exactly like any other tentative
map, except as otherwise provided in the California Subdivision Map Act
or by local ordinance.268 In contrast, a local government is not obligated
to enter into a Development Agreement, although it is required to
"consider" all applications that are submitted for Development
264. See supra notes 257-58 and accompanying text.
265. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 66498.1 and 66498.8.
266. These local governments rely upon: (1) Benny v. City of Alameda, 105 Cal. App. 3d
1006, 164 Cal. Rptr. 776 (1980), which holds that a city may require a developer to obtain all
necessary zoning approvals before the developer is permitted to file its tentative map; (2) Cali-
fornia Government Code section 66411, which gives local governments control over the design
and improvement of subdivisions; and (3) California Government Code section 66452(b),
which provides that a VTM is to be processed in the same manner as a conventional tentative
map except as otherwise provided by the Subdivision Map Act or by a local ordinance adopted
pursuant to the Subdivision Map Act.
267. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 66498.1 (West Supp. 1988).
268. Id. § 66452(b) (West 1983 & Supp. 1988).
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Agreements.269
Second, the parameters of a VTM are often established by local or-
dinances that delineate the specific details relating to project engineering
and planning.27 A Development Agreement, in contrast, requires long,
protracted negotiations to finalize. Therefore, a developer should be pre-
pared for lengthy negotiations and must expect to compromise on certain
facets of the project.
Third, the duration of a Development Agreement is governed by its
own terms. 271 The duration of a VTM is subject to both local ordinances
and statutes that specify a term of no less than one year nor more than
two years beyond recordation of the final map.2 72 However, California
Government Code section 66452.6(a) permits a subdivider to fie final
maps in stages in situations in which the subdivider is required to con-
struct or finance construction of public improvements of $100,000 or
more outside the parameters of the tentative map.273 Each staged filing
extends the expiration of the tentative map for a period of thirty-six
months from its date of expiration, or the date of the previously filed final
map, whichever is later.274 A VTM cannot be extended beyond ten years
from the initial approval date unless a Development Agreement has been
entered into, and then, it is only effective for the term specified in the
Development Agreement.275 It should be noted that the number of
phased final maps that are permitted is determined by the appropriate
advisory agency at the time the tentative tract map is approved.276
Finally, as discussed above,2 77 pursuant to California Government
Code section 66498.1, a VTM merely confers a developer with the right
to proceed with development in substantial compliance with existing or-
dinances, policies and standards. 278 Therefore, a VTM, unlike a Devel-
opment Agreement, does not give a developer the right to construct
certain pre-approved improvements.
Today there are strong public policy reasons supporting this vested
rights legislation.279 Under traditional zoning practices, when a simple
269. Id. § 65865 (West 1983 & Supp. 1988).
270. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 66498.1, 66498.8.
271. Id. § 65865.2 (West 1983 & Supp. 1988).
272. Id. § 66452.6(g).




277. See supra notes 274-75 and accompanying text.
278. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66498.1.
279. The California legislature acknowledged the public policy concerns relating to the De-
velopment Agreement legislation when it stated:
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subdivision map and building permit were all that a developer needed to
establish a vested fight, it might have made sense to fix vested rights at
the time when a building permit was issued. However, present residen-
tial and industrial projects are often vastly more complex. Under
planned unit development zoning,280 for example, the building permit
plays only a minor role in what is frequently a lengthy and complex ap-
proval process. Numerous approvals are often required, such as amend-
ments of general plans, environmental clearances, alterations in traffic
plans, approval of tentative maps, and the issuance of use permits. To
force a developer to remain at risk until the issuance of a building permit
is unwise and unfair. This procedural framework discourages openness
and cooperation between the developer and the local agency. Without
assurances that their long-term projects can be completed as planned,
developers are encouraged to deceptively and artificially phase projects in
an attempt to reduce their risk and establish vested rights on a gradual
basis.21  The end result does not promote sound public planning and
implementation and is not what the California Legislature intended when
it drafted the Development Agreement legislation.28 2
It appears that the legislature's goal was to arm developers with
solid protections in the early stages of the development process. Never-
theless, the Development Agreement and VTM legislation may not be as
effective as the legislature intended.28 3 Despite the flaws in both statutes,
both the Development Agreement and VTM legislation clearly indicate
Assurance to the applicant for a development project that upon approval of the
project, the applicant may proceed with the project in accordance with existing poli-
cies, rules and regulations, and subject to conditions of approval, will strengthen the
public planning process, encourage private participation in comprehensive planning,
and reduce the economic costs of development.
Id. § 65864(b) (West 1983 & Supp. 1988) (emphasis added).
280. Planned Unit Development Zoning is a type of zoning classification whereby a tract of
land is excused from typical zoning laws to allow the development of clustered residential
improvements and/or compatible industrial and commercial uses. This type of developmental
zoning classification allows more flexibility than standard zoning practices and grants diversifi-
cation in the location of improvements and other site attributes. D. HAGMAN, J. LARSON & C.
MARTIN, CALIFORNIA ZONING PRACTICE, § 6.61 (1969 & Supp. 1987).
281. The inherent risk of phasing projects is evident from a review of the court's decision in
Oceanic Cal., Inc. v. North Cent. Coast Regional Comm'n, 63 Cal. App. 3d 57, 133 Cal. Rptr.
664 (1976), cert denied, 431 U.S. 951 (1977). In Oceanic, the developer was forced to obtain
building permits from the California Coastal Commission for subsequent phases of a condo-
minium development. Id., 133 Cal. Rptr. at 666-68. Each subsequent phase was financially
intertwined with several prior phases that were not subject to the Coastal Commission permit
requirement. Id. at 61-64, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 667-68. The developer had acquired the vested
right to complete the construction of the initial structures prior to the enactment of the Coastal
Zone Act. Id. at 62-64, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 667-68.
282. See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
283. See supra notes 200-07 and accompanying text.
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that the California legislature believes that the government should be
precluded from changing the regulations pertaining to a development
once a developer receives discretionary approval for a specific project and
relies on the approval in good faith to its detriment. The legislature has
clearly tried to give developers greater protection by rejecting the un-
yielding building permit requirements mandated in the planned unit de-
velopment context.
IV. INVERSE CONDEMNATION
When a developer is denied a vested right to develop property in an
economically feasible manner, the vested rights issue becomes inter-
twined with the concept of condemnation. Regardless of whether a prop-
erty owner acquires a common-law or statutory vested right, a developer
may challenge the effect of land use regulations on its property as a "tak-
ing" under the just compensation clause of the fifth amendment.284 The
California Constitution also provides that private property may not be
taken for public use without payment of just compensation to its
owner.285 For several years, the just compensation clause of the fifth
amendment has been used to challenge a variety of land use and develop-
ment regulations, including zoning,286 aesthetic consideration ordi-
nances,287 landmark preservation regulations,288 infectious tree disease
ordinances, 2 9 intoxicating liquors regulations, 290 flood control ordinance
restrictions, 291 smoke emission controls, 292 and beach easement require-
ments.293 The regulation and restraint of property, as exemplified by an
overly burdensome land use regulation, can constitute a taking if a prop-
284. "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
285. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 19.
Private property may be taken... for public use only when just compensation, ascer-
tained by a jury unless waived, has first been paid to, or into court for, the owner.
The Legislature may provide for possession by the condemnor following commence-
ment of eminent domain proceedings upon deposit in court and prompt release to the
owner of money determined by the court to be the probable amount of just
compensation.
Id.
286. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
287. Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
288. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
289. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
290. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
291. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct. 2378
(1987).
292. Hadacheck v. Los Angeles, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
293. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
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erty owner's use of his or her property is unduly restricted.294 While this
basic principle appears to be straightforward, determining when a taking
has occurred is difficult. To prevail on a challenge under the fifth amend-
ment with respect to a land use regulation, the property owner must
demonstrate that the regulation either "denies an owner economically
viable use of his land" or "does not substantially advance legitimate state
interests.
295
Generally, a land use regulation will not constitute a taking if it has
an adverse effect only on the recognized economic value of property.
296
Over the years, the courts have applied a balancing test in evaluating the
constitutionality of land use regulations.297 The property right affected
by the regulation is evaluated in the context of the state interest being
advanced-the greater the impact on the property owner, the greater the
state interest required to justify the regulation.298 In applying this bal-
ancing test, the Supreme Court of the United States typically has de-
ferred to state courts on the question of the nature of the property right
being affected.299
The view of the California courts that development is considered a
privilege, not a right, poses an obstacle for developers who bring consti-
tutional challenges to land use regulations." ° The courts in California
have determined that the interest of a developer in proceeding with the
development of its property should be assigned low priority on the scale
of affected rights, and therefore can be offset by moderately compelling
public need.30 1 In addition, although the Supreme Court of the United
States has historically required a "nexus" between the conditions im-
posed by the regulation and the governmental purpose advanced for the
294. See, ag., Candlestick Properties, Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 11 Cal. App. 3d 557, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1970); City of Long Beach v. Aistrup, 164
Cal. App. 2d 41, 330 P.2d 282 (1958).
295. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979), aff'd,
447 U.S. 255 (1980).
296. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 131.
297. See, e.g., Terminal Plaza Corp. v. City and County of San Francisco, 177 Cal. App. 3d
892, 223 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1986); Norsco Enter v. City of Fremont, 54 Cal. App. 3d 488, 126
Cal. Rptr. 659 (1976); Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633,
484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 878 (1971).
298. See, eg., Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3146-49; Agins, 447 U.S. at 260-61; First English, 107 S.
Ct. at 2386-87; Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 130-31.
299. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2384 n.7; San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S.
621 (1981); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
300. Trent Meredith, Inc. v. City of Oxnard, 114 Cal. 3d 317, 170 Cal. Rptr. 685 (1981).
301. See, ag., Candid Enter., Inc. v. Grossmont Union High School Dist., 39 Cal. 3d 878,
705 P.2d 876, 218 Cal. Rptr. 303 (1985); Griffin Dev. Co. v. City of Oxnard, 39 Cal. 3d 256,
703 P.2d 339, 217 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1985).
[Vol. 22:791
VESTED RIGHTS IN CALIFORNIA
regulation,3 "2 the Court generally has deferred to state administrative
and judicial determinations when deciding whether the nexus is adequate
in a given context.30 3
In Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton
Bank,"° the Supreme Court of the United States stated that a property
owner has not been exposed to a violation of the just compensation
clause until "the State fails to provide adequate compensation for the
taking. 305 The Court held that the case was not ripe for a judicial deter-
mination and reasoned that a claim rooted in taking is premature until
the State has been given the opportunity to grant adequate compensation
and has denied such request.30 6 However, in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon,3 0 7 although the Court did find that a land use regulation could
go "too far" and constitute a taking, the Court failed to articulate a stan-
dard for review.30 8 The Court has acknowledged that it has yet to de-
velop a " 'set formula' for determining when 'justice and fairness' require
that economic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the
government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a
few persons."30 9 Instead of setting forth concrete guidelines to determine
these issues, the Court has stated that "whether a particular restriction
will be rendered invalid by the government's failure to pay for any losses
proximately caused by it depends largely 'upon the particular circum-
stances [of the] case.' "310
In order to be sustained, zoning actions, like the exercise of a gov-
ernment's police power, must bear a reasonable relation to the public
health, safety or welfare.3" If a property owner has not acquired a build-
ing permit and has not performed substantial work in reliance thereon,
he or she is unlikely to have an acknowledged vested right to retain the
302. See, e.g., Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3148; Agins, 447 U.S. at 262-63; Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at
130-31.
303. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981); Vance v. Brad-
ley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); United States v. Carolene
Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
304. 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
305. Id. at 195.
306. Id. at 196-97.
307. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
308. Id. at 415-16.
309. Penn. Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
310. Id. (footnotes omitted) (quoting United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S.
155, 168 (1958)).
311. See, e.g., McCarthy v. City of Manhattan Beach, 41 Cal. 2d 879, 264 P.2d 932 (1953),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 817 (1954); see also Hamer v. Town of Ross, 59 Cal. 2d 776, 382 P.2d
375, 31 Cal. Rptr. 335 (1963).
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existing zoning classification. a12 Without a vested right, the sole fact that
a zoning classification is revised, and a more restrictive classification
adopted, does not provide a property owner with a valid claim in inverse
condemnation.313 There is no cause of action in inverse condemnation
even if the more restrictive zoning classification causes a diminution in
the value of the affected property.31 4 If the government can demonstrate
that the revised zoning plan leaves any reasonably beneficial use for the
property, and does not constitute an appropriation of the property for
public use, an action in inverse condemnation is likely to fail.315
In the area of inverse condemnation, most claims for compensation
involve the exercise of a government's zoning power.316 A review of Cal-
317ifornia's leading zoning case, Agins v. City of Tiburon, provides an ex-
planation of the current state of the law in this area. In Agins, the city of
Tiburon, California adopted ordinances that modified the existing zoning
law and redirected the Agins' property into a more restrictive Residential
Planned Development and Open Space Zone.318 The modified restric-
tions on density would have permitted the Agins to construct between
one and five single family residences on their property with a grant of a
variance by the city.319 Instead of filing for a variance, however, the
Agins elected to fie suit in state court alleging that a taking of their
312. See, eg., Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Comm'n, 17 Cal.
3d 785, 553 P.2d 546, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1083 (1977); Oceanic
Cal., Inc. v. North Cent. Coast Regional Comm'n, 63 Cal. App. 3d 57, 133 Cal. Rptr. 664
(1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 951 (1977).
313. See cases cited supra note 289.
314. HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1975),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976).
315. Pinheiro v. County of Matin, 60 Cal. App. 3d 323, 131 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976).
316. See, eg., San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981); Furey v. City
of Sacramento, 24 Cal. 3d 862, 598 P.2d 844, 157 Cal. Rptr. 684<1979); HFH, Ltd. v. Superior
Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1975); Sierra Terreno v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, 79 Cal. App. 3d 439, 144 Cal. Rptr. 776 (1978).
317. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
318. Id. at 257. A Residential Planned Development is a phrase used to describe separately
owned residential parcels which have (a) one or more additional parcels owned in common by
the owners of the separately owned parcels and/or (b) reciprocal or mutual interests in or
restrictions upon all or part of the separately owned parcels of property. This type of develop-
ment is similar to a condominium development except that in a Residential Planned Develop-
ment the parcel owner obtains fee ownership to the land beneath its unit. H. MILLER & M.
STARR, CURRENT LAW OF CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE, § 24:92 (1978 & Supp. 1987). The
term Open Space Zone refers to any parcel of property or area of land or water that is unim-
proved and dedicated to an open space use and which is designated on a regional, local or state
plan as (i) open space for the managed production of resources, (ii) open space for the preser-
vation of natural resources, (ii) open space for outdoor recreation, or (iv) open space for public
health and safety. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65560 (West 1983 & Supp. 1988).
319. 447 U.S. at 257.
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property had occurred.32 ° They contended that the city had "completely
destroyed the value of their property for any purpose or use whatsoever
... "321 The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the decision
of the California Supreme Court and rejected the claim that the local
zoning regulation constituted a taking under current law.322 The Court
stated that the application of a general zoning law to particular property
constitutes a taking if: (1) the ordinance does not substantially advance
legitimate state interests; or (2) the ordinance denies an owner the eco-
nomically viable use of the land.323
Applying this test, the Court held that the City of Tiburon's open
space ordinances did in fact substantially advance a legitimate govern-
mental goal-that of discouraging the "premature and unnecessary con-
version of open-space land to urban uses," 324-- and was therefore an
appropriate exercise of the City's police power. Additionally, the Court
stated that although it was true that the ordinances did serve to limit
development, the ordinances neither acted to destroy any fundamental
attributes of ownership nor prevented the property owner from realizing
the highest and best use of the property. 325
A. The Legitimate State Interest Test
In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,326 the Supreme Court
of the United States refined the first part of the Agins test. The issue
before the Court was whether a California Coastal Commission develop-
ment permit condition that required dedication of a lateral access ease-
ment along the Nollans' private beach constituted a taking.327 The Court
applied the Agins test and rejected the state's argument that the dedica-
tion substantially furthered the legitimate state interest in providing an
unobstructed view of the coastline.328 Although the Court stated that it
had not previously specified what was required in order to pass the first
part of the Agins test, the Court decided that the dedication requirement
was insufficient.329
320. Id. at 258.
321. Id.
322. Id. at 259.
323. Id. at 260.
324. Id. at 261 (citing CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65561(b) (West Supp. 1979)).
325. Id. at 262.
326. 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987). See infra notes 367-99 and accompanying text.
327. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3144.
328. Id. at 3146-47.
329. Id. at 3149.
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In Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis,33 ° the
Supreme Court recognized that the two prongs of the test enumerated in
Agins "have become integral parts of our takings analysis. ' 331 In Key-
stone, the Court expanded on the first branch of the test, and stated that
even among those regulations that substantially advance a legitimate
state interest, some government interests will be more defensible than
others.332 The Court relied on Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon 333 for the
proposition that the nature of the state interest justifying the regulation is
a vital factor in determining whether there has been a taking, and conse-
quently whether compensation is required.334 The Court in Keystone was
reluctant to find a taking when government simply seeks to limit the use
of real property to prevent a contemplated use that is considered to be a
nuisance.335 The Court reasoned that a landowner is not entitled to use
its land if the use will create a public nuisance.336 Thus, there is not a
"taking" when the state promulgates a regulation to enjoin the activity
creating the nuisance.337
B. The Economic Viability Test
Although a governmental regulation can have an adverse impact on
the value of real property, mere fluctuations in the present value of real
property "are incidents of ownership. They cannot be considered as a
'taking' in the constitutional sense."' 338 In an effort to explain the justifi-
cation for some form of governmental regulation in the land use context,
the Court in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon 339 observed that:
Government hardly could go on if to some extent values inci-
dent to property could not be diminished without paying for
every such change in the general law. As long recognized,
some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must
yield to the police power. But obviously the implied limitation
must have its limits, or the contract and due process clauses are
gone. One fact for consideration in determining such limits is
the extent of the diminution. When it reaches a certain magni-
330. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
331. Id. at 485.
332. Id. at 488-89.
333. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
334. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 488-89.
335. Id. at 491.
336. Id. at 491-92
337. Id. at 492.
338. Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271, 285 (1939).
339. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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tude, in most if not in all cases there must be an exercise of
eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act. So the
question depends on the particular facts. 3"
In deciding whether certain property owners had been deprived of
the "economically viable use" of their land, the Court in Keystone Bitu-
minous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis341 ruled that proper analysis re-
quires the Court to compare the value taken from the landowner's
property with the actual value remaining in the landowner's property
after the regulation is imposed.342 A court's characterization or defini-
tion of the value of the property that has been taken is a threshold re-
quirement in arriving at a final figure.343
The plaintiffs in Keystone owned or controlled substantial coal
reserves that were affected by the Pennsylvania Bituminous Mine Subsi-
dence and Land Conservation Act (Subsidence Act).3" The plaintiffs
alleged that the required compliance with the Subsidence Act constituted
a taking of their property which required just compensation.345
Instead of focusing on the claim that the Subsidence Act required
the plaintiffs to forego mining almost twenty-seven million tons of coal
located within their mines, the Court focused on the fact that this
twenty-seven million tons of coal was less than two percent of the total
coal available to plaintiffs within their own mines.346 The Court con-
cluded that the Subsidence Act had affected such a small portion of the
owners' potential coal production that the owners had "not shown any
deprivation significant enough to satisfy the heavy burden placed upon
one alleging a regulatory taking."34 7
In Grupe v. California Coastal Commission,3"' a 1985 case decided
by the California Court of Appeal, the plaintiff brought an action to in-
validate an easement condition that was required by the California
Coastal Commission in connection with plaintiff's proposed develop-
ment.349 The plaintiff contended that the required dedication was tanta-
mount to a taking of his property withdut just compensation.
350
340. Id. at 413.
341. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
342. Id. at 497.
343. Id.
344. Id. at 478.
345. Id. at 478-79.
346. Id. at 496.
347. Id. at 493.
348. 166 Cal. App. 3d 148, 212 Cal. Rptr. 578 (1985).
349. Id. at 156, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 581.
350. Id. at 171, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 592.
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To decide whether the easement condition constituted a taking, the
court applied the Agins test and found that the condition imposed on the
plaintiff did not "rob" him of all reasonable use and economic value of
his property. 31 The court thereby interpreted Agins as requiring the
complete and total deprivation of all use of one's property in order to
constitute a taking. Further, the court ruled that it was not unjust to
require the plaintiff alone to bear the burden of the easement condi-
tion.35 2 The court reasoned that the plaintiff had received a substantial
benefit from the local commission's decision to allow the development of
plaintiff's property in the first place.353 When this benefit was compared
with the value of plaintiff's property as developed, the economic loss was
not significant enough to support a finding that a taking had occurred.
354
The court also acknowledged the importance of the government's
need to foster public rights:
Where the state or its subdivisions have acted to promote the
public trust and such action has resulted in damage to the prop-
erty rights of upland owners, the courts have generally been
unwilling to find a taking, even though the action might be
deemed a taking in a non-trust context.355
Although the court did recognize that there could be incidences where a
taking has occurred when the state was acting to further the purposes of
the public trust, the court reiterated that "courts have been extraordina-
rily deferential to state action designed to further the purposes of public
trust, even though such action results in significant economic injury to
individuals." '356
C. Is There a Nexus?
When faced with the question of whether land use regulations or
conditions create an unfair restraint and burden on property, the courts
typically will affirm the constitutionality of an ordinance, regulation or
condition that requires the payment of a fee or dedication of a property
right as a prerequisite to land-use approval or the grant of a building
permit if both of the following conditions are met: (1) the land use regu-
lation imposed must substantially advance a legitimate governmental in-
terest that is within the local agency's police power; and (2) a nexus must
351. Id. at 175, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 596.
352. Id. at 177, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 597.
353. Id. at 176-77, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 596-97.
354. Id. at 177, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 597.
355. Id. at 171, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 592-93 (footnote omitted).
356. Id. at 172, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 593.
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exist between the required land use regulation or condition and the gov-
ernmental purpose that is relied upon for regulating the landowner's
property.
357
Recently, the nexus requirement has emerged as the principal area
of controversy in inverse condemnation law.35 8 The California courts
have generally required a similar nexus to exist between the imposition of
a regulation or condition and the proferred governmental purpose. 359
The 1971 California Supreme Court decision of Associated Home Build-
ers v. City of Walnut Creek 30 dismantled the California courts' histori-
cally restrictive direct-nexus theory that had been used in connection
with dedications that are required for the issuance of land use permits.361
In Associated Home Builders, the plaintiff challenged the constitu-
tionality of section 11546 of the California Business and Professions
Code, which authorized a city or county government to require a subdi-
vider to dedicate land, or pay fees in lieu thereof, for park or recreational
purposes as a condition to the approval of a subdivision map.362 The
plaintiff subdividers argued that the land use dedications required by the
statute could be constitutional only if the state could demonstrate that
the need for the dedication was directly attributable to the subdivision at
issue;363 otherwise, the dedications deprived the subdivider of the use of
its property without just compensation. 36 The Court rejected this claim
and stated that it had "no doubt that... [the statute] can be justified on
the basis of a general public need for recreational facilities caused by
present and future subdivisions. 3 6 Therefore, the Court held that there
only has to be an indirect connection, or nexus, between a dedication or
fee requirement and the regulation of a proposed development.366
The most recent United States Supreme Court case that considered
the nexus requirement is Nollan v. California Coastal Commission.367 In
357. See, eg., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987); Agins v. City
of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d
1 (1949).
358. See sources cited supra note 23.
359. See, eg., Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d
606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1971); Ayres, 34 Cal. 2d at 42-43, 207 P.2d at 16-17 (1949); Scrutton v.
County of Sacramento, 275 Cal. App. 2d 412, 79 Cal. Rptr. 872 (1969).
360. 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr 630 (1971).
361. See sources cited supra note 359.
362. Id. at 635, 484 P.2d at 608, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 632-33.
363. Id. at 637-38, 484 P.2d at 610, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 634.
364. Id. at 637, 484 P.2d at 610, 94 Cal. Rptr at 634.
365. Id. at 638, 484 P.2d at 610, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 634.
366. Id. at 638-39, 484 P.2d at 610-11, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 634-35.
367. 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
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Nollan, the plaintiffs tried to obtain a rebuilding permit from the Califor-
nia Coastal Commission to allow them to tear down their existing single
story beachfront house in Ventura County, California and replace it with
a two-story house.36 The Commission ruled that the proposed construc-
tion would block the view of the ocean, and thus add to the development
of "a wall of residential structures that would prevent the public from
'psychologically... realizing [that] a stretch of coastline exists nearby
that they have every right to visit.' "9 The Commission agreed to ap-
prove the proposed construction only on the condition that the Nollans
grant the public an easement to pass along the beachfront in front of
their property.370 After unsuccessfully challenging this easement condi-
tion before the California Coastal Commission and the California
courts,37 x the Nollans appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of the
United States and asserted that the condition was a taking under the fifth
and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution. 72
The Court reversed the California court rulings and held that the
dedication was tantamount to a taking.3 73 The Court decided that if the
state of California had required the Nollans to grant a permanent public
easement across their property in order to increase the public's access to
the beach, instead of conditioning their rebuilding permit on the ease-
ment, that action would certainly have constituted a taking.374 The
Court stated that the government's claim that an appropriation of an
easement across one's property is not a taking but rather "a mere restric-
tion on use" essentially deprives those words of their common-sense
meaning. 375 The Court held that although the exaction of the required
easement would certainly violate the takings clause, conditioning the
Nollans' permit on their granting of the easement would nevertheless be
a lawful land use regulation if it substantially furthered governmental
purposes that would justify denial of the permit.376 The Court indicated
that if the California Coastal Commission had conditioned the public-
access easement on the public's need to view the coastline, and had val-
idly supported its decision, the Nollans might have been required to
368. Id. at 3143.
369. Id. at 3143-44 (quoting App. Brief at 58).
370. Id.
371. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 177 Cal. App. 3d 719, 223 Cal. Rptr. 28 (1986),
rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
372. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3143-45.
373. Id. at 3150.
374. Id. at 3145.
375. Id.
376. Id. at 3148.
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grant a portion of their beachfront property for the benefit of those desir-
ing to view the coastline.377
The Court acknowledged that land use regulations do not constitute
a taking if they substantially further legitimate governmental interests
and do not deny a property owner the economically viable use of the
land.378 The Court concluded that the public-access easement condition
imposed by the California Coastal Commission failed to further the gov-
ernmental interest advanced to justify the condition.379 Unless a permit
condition serves the same governmental purpose as the development ban,
the building restriction is not a valid regulation of land use but an "out-
and-out plan of extortion. 
' 3 80
The Court did not dispute that preserving the public's ability to see
the beach from the nearby public roadways was a legitimate governmen-
tal interest.38 1 The Court nevertheless concluded that when the condi-
tion imposed fails to further the justified purpose of the imposition, the
required nexus does not exist and "the situation becomes the same as if
California law forbade shouting fire in a crowded theater, but granted
dispensation to those willing to contribute $100 to the state treasury.
382
Since the imposition of the public-access easement condition did not di-
rectly further the stated public purposes related to the permit require-
ment, it was not an appropriate exercise of land use regulation.383
377. Id. at 3147-48.
378. Id. at 3146.
379. Id. at 3148.
380. Id. at 3148 (citation omitted).
381. Id. at 3147.
382. Id. at 3148.
383. Id. The California Coastal Commission claimed that a building permit condition,
based upon the same legitimate police power purpose as a denial of a building permit, should
not be classified as a taking if the denial of the building permit would not be a taking. The
Court in dicta agreed with the California Coastal Commission's assertion and observed that:
[I]f the Commission attached to the permit some condition that would have pro-
tected the public's ability to see the beach notwithstanding construction of a new
house-for example, a height limitation, a width restriction, or a ban on fences-so
long as the Commission could have exercised its police power (as we have assumed it
could) to forbid construction of the house altogether, imposition of the condition
would also be constitutional. Moreover (and here we come closer to the facts of the
present case), the condition would be constitutional even if it consisted of the require-
ment that the Nollans provide a viewing spot on their property for passersby with
whose sighting of the ocean their new house would interfere. Although such a re-
quirement, constituting a permanent grant of continuous access to the property,
would have to be considered a taking if it were not attached to a development permit,
the Commission's assumed power to forbid construction of the house in order to
protect the public's view of the beach must surely include the power to condition
construction upon some concession by the owner, even a concession of property
rights, that serves the same end. If a prohibition designed to accomplish that pur-
pose would be a legitimate exercise of police power rather than a taking, it would be
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In sum, Nollan requires a nexus between the land use condition and
the burden imposed on the landowner.38 4 If no nexus exists, the land use
regulation imposed is improper and constitutes a taking of real property
for which compensation must be paid to the landowner pursuant to the
fifth and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution.
385
The Nollan Court appeared to reject the indirect-nexus theory that
some California courts were following after the Associated Home Build-
ers decision.386 The indirect nexus theory is based on the premise that
real estate development is a privilege and not a right.387 In Nollan, the
Court rejected the state court's characterization of the property right in-
volved as a privilege and noted that: "[T]he right to build on one's own
property-even though its exercise can be subjected to legitimate permit-
ting requirements-cannot remotely be described as a 'governmental
benefit.' ",388 In effect, Nollan eviscerated one ground used by the gov-
ernment to justify mandatory development conditions that are imposed
on real estate developments-namely, that a condition is a reasonable
quidpro quo for the "benefit" that the developer will gain from building.
It still remains unclear whether the Supreme Court has formulated a
strict nexus formula. Although the Court held that the public access
condition in Nollan was unconstitutional,389 the Court did not state how
close the nexus must be in order for a regulation to substantially further
the legitimate state interest which is the basis for the land use regulation.
The Court provided some guidance to landowners and government enti-
ties by observing that its previous decisions indicated "that a broad range
of governmental purposes and regulations satisfies these require-
ments. '3 9 1 One must not misinterpret Nollan as holding that the re-
strange to conclude that providing the owner an alternative which accomplishes the
same purpose is not.
Id. at 3147-48. The Court concluded that where a lateral easement is required for access to the
beach but is justified on the basis that the easement is required to maintain the view of the
coastline, a constitutional gap occurs between the land use regulation and the findings of fact.
Id.
384. Id. at 3148.
385. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
386. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3148-49; see Nollan, 177 Cal. App. 3d at 723, 223 Cal. Rptr. at
30-31; Whaler's Village Club v. California Coastal Comm'n, 173 Cal. App. 3d 240, 220 Cal.
Rptr. 2 (1985), cert denied, 476 U.S. 1111 (1986); Grupe v. California Coastal Comm'n, 166
Cal. App. 3d 148, 212 Cal. Rptr. 578 (1985).
387. See supra notes 300-03 and accompanying text.
388. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3146 n.2.
389. Id. at 3148.
390. Id. at 3147; see also Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton
Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985); Agins, 447 U.S. at 260-61; Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New
York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Goreib v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927); Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 U.S. 365 (1926).
[Vol. 22:791
VESTED RIGHTS IN CALIFORNIA
quired easement can be upheld only if the proposed development creates
the need for the dedication. This argument was rejected earlier by the
California Supreme Court in Associated Home Builders.391 After Nollan,
the state of the law indicates that a mandatory condition will be upheld
only if it materially furthers the same governmental purpose advanced
for regulating the development.392 Importantly, the Nollan Court did
imply that land use regulations that physically deprive a landowner of
real property will be subject to stricter scrutiny than those regulations
involving only the imposition of fees.393
In an effort to define the nexus requirement ffirther, sections 66000
through 66003 were added to the California Government Code in
1987. 31' Effective January 1, 1989, these sections impose certain condi-
tions on any local agency that exacts a fee, other than a tax or special
assessment,395 as a condition for approval of a development project if the
purpose of the fee is to defray all or a portion of the cost of public facili-
ties related to the development.396 Specifically, section 66001 requires
the local agency imposing the fee to determine: (1) if there is a reason-
able connection between the use of the fee and the type of development
project on which the fee is being imposed; 397 and (2) to specifically deter-
mine if there is a reasonable connection between the need for the public
facility and the kind of development on which the fee is being im-
posed. 398 Finally, section 66001 requires any local agency that imposes
such a fee to show a reasonable relationship, or nexus, between the
amount of the fee and the cost of the public facility that is related to the
development.399 Certainly, these requirements force local agencies to
satisfy the nexus requirement at the outset when a development fee is
imposed.
D. Monetary Damages For Unconstitutional Land Use Regulations
In First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Ange-
les,' the Supreme Court of the United States held that the just compen-
sation clause of the fifth amendment entitles a property owner to recover
391. Associated Home Builders, 4 Cal. 3d at 640, 484 P.2d at 61, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
392. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3148.
393. Id.
394. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 66000-66003 (West Supp. 1988).
395. Id. § 66000(b).
396. Id. §§ 66000-66001.
397. Id. § 66001(a)(3).
398. Id. § 66001(a)(4).
399. Id. § 66001(b).
400. 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987).
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damages if a land use restriction constitutes a taking of property, even if
the taking is only temporary." 1 Prior to First English, the California
Supreme Court had strictly held that when a landowner had been denied
all beneficial use of property as a result of unreasonable governmental
regulation, the landowner was not entitled to a damage award and could
only seek a court order invalidating the unreasonable regulation as a vio-
lation of the due process requirements of the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments." 2 In reversing the California precedent, the Supreme Court of
the United States ruled that the remedy for a taking by a land use regula-
tion is compensation, and not merely the invalidation of the land use reg-
ulation in question." 3 The Court held further that compensation accrues
from the date that a final determination is made that there has been a
taking, even if the taking is only temporary.'
In 1957, First English Evangelical Church (First English) acquired
a large parcel of land located in a canyon along the banks of the Middle
Fork of Mill Creek in the Angeles National Forest."° The Middle Fork
was a drainage channel for a watershed area that was owned by the
United States Forest Service." 6 Twelve acres of the property owned by
the church were flatlands containing certain structural improvements.
The church operated a campground on the site, and used it as a retreat
center and a recreational area for handicapped children." 7 In July of
1977, a forest fire destroyed approximately 4,000 acres of the watershed
area surrounding the church's campground, and created a serious flood
hazard." 8 Mill Creek flooded in February of 1978 and destroyed all of
the buildings located at the church's site.4 9
After the flooding, the County of Los Angeles, California adopted
Interim Ordinance No. 11,855, which provided that "[a] person shall not
construct, reconstruct, place or enlarge any building or structure, any
portion of which is, or will be, located within the outer boundary lines of
the interim flood protection area located in Mill Creek Canyon .... 41o
First English filed a complaint against the county, alleging, among other
things, that imposition of the Interim Ordinance constituted an imper-
401. Id. at 2387-88.
402. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979), aff'd,
447 U.S. 255 (1980).
403. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2386.
404. Id. at 2387-89.





410. Id. at 2381-82.
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missible taking.4 1' Relying on Agins v. City of Tiburon,412 the trial court
dismissed the church's claim, and found that when an ordinance deprives
a landowner of the entire use of its property, the landowner may chal-
lenge the ordinance only by an action for declaratory relief or manda-
mus.4 13 The trial court reasoned that since First English sought only
monetary relief, the allegation that the Interim Ordinance deprived the
church of the use of its land was irrelevant.414 The California Court of
Appeal also relied on Agins and rejected the church's claim.415 The
Court of Appeal declined the invitation to reevaluate A gins. 16 The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court denied review, and the case was appealed to the
Supreme Court of the United States. 17
First English is best analyzed as a compensation case rather than a
takings case because the Supreme Court assumed in its analysis that a
taking had already been established. 18 The Court held that the invalida-
tion of the Interim Ordinance alone, without payment of monetary dam-
ages for the period of time that the church was denied the use of its
property was unconstitutional.4 9 The case was then remanded to the
California trial court for a determination of whether the imposition of
the flood control ordinance resulted in a taking of the church's
property.42
With regard to the payment of monetary damages, the Court ex-
plained that "where a government's activities have already worked a tak-
ing of all use of property, no subsequent action by the government can
relieve it of the duty to provide compensation for the period during
which the taking was effective.""42 With this statement, the Court ac-
knowledged that first, even if a government suspends a regulation at a
later date, compensation must nevertheless be paid for that period of
time when the regulation was in effect.422 Second, the Court addressed a
previously undecided issue by recognizing that compensation is a viable
remedy when a regulatory taking occurs.423 As discussed above, it is
411. Id. at 2382.
412. 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).










423. See, eg., MacDonald Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340 (1986); William-
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important to note that the Court decided that damages constitute an
available remedy only if a taking is found.424 The Court remanded to the
lower court the more difficult question of whether the Interim Ordinance
actually constituted a taking. 25 The Court was unwilling to decide
whether the land use regulation denied the church all beneficial use of its
real property because the case reached the Court on a motion to dismiss
and the question of whether a taking had occurred had not been raised in
the complaint.426
Significantly, the Court noted that although the doctrine of inverse
condemnation is predicated on the theory that a taking can occur with-
out formal condemnation proceedings, the California Supreme Court had
"truncated" this rule with its decision in Agins.427 The Court reasoned
that "by disallowing damages that occurred prior to the ultimate invali-
dation of the challenged regulation," '428 the California Supreme Court
failed to strictly follow the requirements of the just compensation clause
of the fifth amendment.429 In arriving at this conclusion, the First Eng-
lish Court was guided by cases in which governments had only temporar-
ily exercised their right to use the real property of private citizens.430
The Court reviewed several early cases involving the appropriation of
private property for government use during World War 11. 43 1 The Court
concluded that although the "takings" in these World War II cases were
only temporary, "there was no question that compensation would be re-
quired for the government's interference with the use of the property
.... "432 The Court did not, however, rule that a land use regulation that
falls short of depriving a landowner of all beneficial use of its property
constitutes a constitutional taking.43 3 Citing Danforth v. United States
434
and Agins v. City of Tiburon,435 the Court distinguished between depriv-
son County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985); San Diego
Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
424. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2389.
425. Id.
426. Id. at 2384-85.
427. Id. at 2387 (citing Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 372 (1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 255 (1980)).
428. Id.
429. Id.
430. Id. (citing Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949); United States v.
Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946); United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373
(1945)).
431. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2387.
432. Id.
433. Id. at 2387-88.
434. 308 U.S. 271 (1939).
435. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
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ing a landowner of all of the use of the property (a "taking") and the
mere fluctuation in the value of the property (an incident of
ownership).436
The Court's decision in First English sends a strong message to all
government entities: when a land use regulation is found to be unconsti-
tutional, a government can be required to invalidate the unconstitutional
restriction and, in addition, to pay damages for the period of time during
which the land use regulation denied the property owner all use of the
land.437
First English makes it clear that the price of a governmental "wrong
guess" has gone up. Together Nollan and First English increase the bar-
gaining strength of the developer and the land use planner during the
development process.
Nollan and First English may also lead to a number of changes in
the way land use issues are handled by developers and regulators. First,
since stalling and procrastination by the government may prove expen-
sive, speedier decision-making and streamlined litigation may result.4 3 8
Second, government agencies may attempt to develop rational and
clearly articulated regulations and development conditions, which are
supported by objective studies demonstrating how the regulations or con-
ditions directly and specifically mitigate the impact of a particular devel-
opment. Finally, the incidence of "takings" lawsuits may increase,
particularly in communities that are under pressure to curb future
growth.
IV. CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion illustrates the tremendous challenges fac-
ing developers in California during the current slow-growth era. Nega-
tive public sentiment, coupled with governmental discretion, has created
uncertainty for developers with respect to the viability of constructing
proposed projects. Until a developer obtains a validly issued building
permit and incurs substantial liabilities in good faith reliance on the per-
mit, it cannot be certain that new obstacles will not thwart the comple-
tion of a proposed development. Short of the issuance of a building
permit, a California developer is well-advised to file a Vesting Tentative
Map and, where permissible, enter into a Development Agreement. The
Vesting Tentative Map and the Development Agreement together do not
436. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2388.
437. Id. at 2388-89.
438. Id. at 2389.
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provide a comprehensive solution, but do provide the developer with
some welcome protections and guidelines. Finally, developers must keep
in mind that although completing a development is the primary objec-
tive, if the circumstances warrant it, a developer can bring an action in
inverse condemnation and seek compensation for the taking of its
property.
